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Foreword
Homosexuality was much in the news at the start of 2013. In January mass protests were 
mounted in France against proposals to allow same-sex couples to marry and adopt 
children. The public expressions of discontent fell on deaf ears: in early February a large 
majority of the French parliament voted in favour of allowing same-sex marriage. In the 
same month, a large majority in the British House of Commons also voted to allow 
same-sex marriage in England and Wales. While the passage of these bills in France 
and Britain brought the equal treatment of homosexual and heterosexual individuals a 
step closer, the Polish parliament voted against a form of civil partnership for same-sex 
couples and the Russian parliament drastically curtailed the rights of lesbian, gay and 
bisexual citizens. If the ‘anti-gay propaganda bill’ is passed into Russian law, it will make 
providing information on homosexuality and bisexuality a punishable offence, along 
with organising demonstrations in favour of equal rights and possibly references to 
homosexuality in books and films. Many European countries and international organi-
sations have made known their disapproval of the new Russian proposals.
Public opinion on homosexuality plays a major role in the public debate on ‘gay mar-
riage’ and how it is reported in the media. How do public attitudes to homosexuality 
vary across different European countries? Is acceptance increasing or decreasing? And 
how is it possible that there are such wide differences within Europe? The Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research/scp addresses these questions in this report. The report 
explores and explains developments and differences in attitudes to homosexuality in 
European countries on the basis of large-scale European data sets. In which countries 
is acceptance increasing – or decreasing? Which countries can currently be regarded as 
tolerant and in which countries are there clear limits to the acceptance of homosexual-
ity? Which factors underlie the differences? Are they caused by differences in income, 
education, degree of urbanisation, religion, political situation or attitudes with regard 
to gender? Are the differences between countries still substantial after controlling for 
these factors?
This report was compiled at the request of the Emancipation Department at the Dutch 
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. In addition to members of the internal 
 advisory committee, Professor Jan Willem Duyvendak (University of Amsterdam) made 
comments and put forward suggestions for the research plan and draft report. On be-
half of the researchers, I would like to thank him for his valuable contribution and 
 colla borative approach.
Prof. dr. Paul Schnabel
Director, Netherlands Institute for Social Research
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1 47 countries, 47 opinions
The position of lesbian, gay, and bisexual citizens (l gb s) differs widely across Europe.1 
Currently, marriage between same-sex partners is allowed in several countries, while 
in others there is no possibility of having a same-sex partnership registered. There are 
as many people taking to the streets to show their support for equal rights as there are 
 people flocking to the streets to restrict those rights. There are several European coun-
tries in which l gb individuals are respectable members of parliament, while in other 
European countries respectable members of parliament condemn l gb individuals. 
In some parts of Europe, l gb events are proudly hosted by state officials such as minis-
ters, mayors and members of parliament, while in others state officials obstruct or ban 
such events. At a time when education about homosexuality is becoming a mandatory 
part of the official school curriculum in some countries, other countries decry refer-
ences to homosexuality in education as ‘homosexual propaganda’ and design laws to 
ban this altogether.
In addition to a wide variation in l gb policies and laws, public attitudes towards l gb 
people also differ widely between European countries, ranging from broad tolerance 
to widespread rejection. For example, the most recent Eurobarometer survey (Special 
Eurobarometer 393 2012) showed that in Sweden, only 2% of the population would feel 
totally uncomfortable with an l gb person in the highest elected political position in the 
country. In the Slovak Republic, by contrast, only 2% would feel totally comfortable with 
it. Attitudes and policies are interconnected, making attitudes an important factor in 
promoting equality in Europe. It is for this reason that this reports looks at this issue.
1.1 Attitudes and equality: two-way traffic
Public attitudes towards homosexuality shape the lives of millions of l gb citizens in 
various ways. Firstly, people’s attitudes are related to their behaviour. There is a strong 
relationship between negative attitudes and anti-gay behaviour (Bernat et al. 2001; 
Franklin 2000; Patel et al. 1995; Parrott 2008). If public attitudes in a particular country 
are overly negative, l gb individuals face negative reactions and discrimination when 
looking for a job, going to school, participating in sport, accessing health care or inter-
acting with family and friends.
In addition to the relationship between negative attitudes and anti-gay behaviour, pub-
lic opinion plays an important role in the development of laws and policies. Public atti-
tudes, policies and laws related to l gb issues are interconnected (Lax and Phillips 2009; 
Loftus 2001; Meeusen and Hooghe 2012; Riggle et al. 2010; Takács and Szalma 2011). One 
way in which public opinion shapes policies and laws is through the ‘electoral connec-
tion’ (Lax and Phillips 2009: 369). Politicians often have a strong desire to be (re)elected 
and are therefore sensitive to opinions held by large tracts of the population in order to 
gain popularity. Lax and Phillips (2009) show that more supportive public opinions are 
associated with higher probabilities of l gb policy adoption by the state, especially when 
an issue is prominent in the public debate. In that case, politicians are more willing to 
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comply with the opinion of the majority (or at least a substantial part of the population) 
to show their democratic and representative qualities. On the other hand, the way in 
which policies and laws are designed and framed shapes public opinion and behaviour 
(Bröer 2006; Pierson 1993). Policies and laws shape the dominant public discourse, which 
in turn exerts an influence on everyday life. Shifts in policies on certain issues lead to 
shifts in the perceptions, attitudes and experiences of citizens. The interplay between 
policies and laws varies between countries, changes over time and depends on the 
 political system and configuration of political parties within a country.
The relationship between attitudes and behaviour and the interconnection of attitudes 
and laws and policies makes public attitudes worth studying. Those attitudes are more 
than just individual opinions; they are one of the pillars of the enhancement of equality 
and non-discrimination. By studying population attitudes to homosexuality in Europe, 
the Netherlands Institute for Social Research|scp seeks to contribute to the policy aim 
of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science (oc w) of promoting the equal 
rights and safety of l gb people in Europe (t k 2010/2011). Having an insight into the sta-
bility of and changes in public attitudes and the factors that influence those attitudes 
provides pointers on how to address this topic when designing policies and programmes 
to enhance equal rights and safety.
1.2 This report
Recent cross-European reports by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (fr a 
2008, 2009, 2011), the European Commission (ec 2008, 2009, 2012), and scp (Keuzen-
kamp 2011; Keuzenkamp and Bos 2007) provide reliable overviews of the current social 
situation and of public attitudes to homosexuality in Europe. However, due to their 
comprehensive and descriptive nature, these reports lack the space to explore shifts in 
attitudes and factors that explain differences between countries. An insight into these 
shifts and factors is essential when addressing this pillar of the development of poli-
cies and programmes to enhance equal rights and safety. This report therefore explores 
whether there are any shifts in attitudes in different European countries. Are there 
European countries which are moving towards more tolerance? Are there countries 
moving in the other direction? And are there countries where attitudes have stayed the 
same over the years? This report not only describes changes in attitudes within European 
countries, but also seeks explanations for differences between countries. Whilst seeking 
these explanations, specific attention will be devoted to gender issues. For example, are 
more tolerant attitudes to homosexuality found in countries which hold less traditional 
attitudes to appropriate gender roles and which have high levels of gender equality in 
education, economics and politics? In sum, this report addresses three research ques-
tions:
1 Which shifts in public attitudes towards homosexuality2 can be found in European 
countries?
2 To what degree are gender issues related to attitudes towards homosexuality in 
 Europe?
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3 To what degree can differences in attitudes between European countries be explained 
by modernization, religion and policies and politics?
The questions regarding shifts in attitudes will be addressed in chapter 2, followed in 
chapter 3 by an analysis of the association between various gender issues and attitudes 
to homosexuality. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the literature on explanations for 
current differences between countries and tests these explanations together with gender 
issues in a single overarching model. Chapter 5 tries to bring the facts and figures to life 
by examining some actual country cases. Chapter 6 consists of summarizing, criticizing, 
and concluding comments. A summary in Dutch and in English is added after the last 
chapter.
The report draws on various existing cross-European surveys. To address the question 
of changes over time, data are used from the European Values Study (e vs) and the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ess). Both studies are large-scale, cross-national surveys of values 
conducted at various time intervals in more than 20 European countries including more 
than 50,000 participants in their recent editions. While other large-scale cross-European 
studies exist (e.g. Eurobarometer, International Social Survey Programme), the e vs and 
ess are the only reliable cross-European studies which include the same questions on 
l gb attitudes at regular time intervals, allowing for reliable analyses over time.
The e vs contains two questions on attitudes to homosexuality: whether people believe 
that homosexuality is justifiable and how they would feel about having homosexual 
neighbours. The e vs data were collected in 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008. In order to be able 
to examine changes over time, only the countries for which at least three waves of data 
are available could be included in the second chapter of this report. A total of 27 coun-
tries completed at least three waves and were used for the analyses in chapter 2: Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Malta.3
The ess contains one item pertaining to homosexuality: gay men and lesbians should 
be free to live their own lives as they wish. The ess collected data in 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, and 2010. In order to be able to examine changes over time, only the countries for 
which at least three waves of data are available could be included in the second chapter 
of this report. A total of 24 countries completed at least three waves: Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, 
 Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Greece, Spain and Portugal.
Since the e vs contains more questions on gender attitudes, the in-depth analyses of 
the factors explaining different levels of acceptance of homosexuality are conducted 
using the e vs data only. The data from the 2008 round of data collection were used for 
the analyses. Since the prerequisite of having completed at least three waves of data 
collection was not necessary for the analyses of the relationship between gender issues 
and homosexuality, an additional eighteen countries could be included in the analyses: 
 Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, 
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Georgia, Greece, Luxembourg, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
 Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and Macedonia.4
More information regarding the data collection and research methodology of both 
 studies can be found online at www.scp.nl, www.europeansocialsurvey.org and  
www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
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2 Exploring shifts and differences
Public attitudes are not set in stone, but are subject to change. Previous studies con-
ducted in Europe and the United States (us) have shown substantial changes in attitudes 
towards homosexuality over time (e.g. Hadler 2012; Loftus 2001; Van den Meerendonk 
and Scheepers 2006). This chapter elaborates on these academic papers by providing an 
overview of the changes that have taken place in different European countries since the 
beginning of the 1980s. Which countries are becoming increasingly tolerant? Are there 
European countries which are moving towards greater intolerance? And are there coun-
tries where no change is taking place, or where previous changes in attitudes have come 
to an end?
Below, all percentages and developments are presented, but only highlights are dis-
cussed. After each section, a graph of Europe summarizing the overall findings is pre-
sented. When examining multiple attitudes across multiple years for 27 countries, it is 
not possible to discuss all similarities and differences between countries and years sepa-
rately. For this discussion, countries are clustered for sheer heuristic purposes (‘in the 
weakest sense’, according to Castles and Obinger 2008). This means that without want-
ing to imply that a geographical/historical dimension is a meaningful dimension when 
examining attitudes to homosexuality, the figures are presented along geographical and 
historical lines across Europe: North, West, Central/East, and South.5
14
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Figure 2.1
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2.1 Shifts since the 1980s
Acceptance of homosexuality
Ever since the first edition of the e vs was published in 1981, participants have given 
their responses to the question ‘Do you think that homosexuality can always be justi-
fied, never be justified, or something in between?’. The result is often interpreted as a 
 measure of general acceptance of homosexuality.
Figure 2.2
Mean scores on justification of homosexuality, per region per e vs round; higher scores indicate more 
justificationa, b
north west central/east south
1 never
5.5
10 always
1981 1990 1999 2008
a Appendix B, table 1A shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b The question in the e vs is: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think 
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between...[homosexuality]’. Answers 
were given on a 10-point scale (1 = never, 10 = always).
Source: e vs’81, ’90, ’99, ’08
In all European regions, public attitudes towards homosexuality have changed over the 
last 30 years. European citizens consider homosexuality more justifiable in 2008 than 
in 1981/1990. Where in 1981/1990 all regions had average attitudes that were clearly be-
low the midpoint of the scale (indicating intolerant attitudes to homosexuality), this is 
currently only the case in Central/East and in Southern Europe. The biggest change in 
attitudes took place between 1990 and 1999 in the various regions.
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Figures combining countries in a region readily obscure differences between countries 
within regions. Therefore, the analyses are repeated on country level. 
Figure 2.3
Mean scores on justification of homosexuality, per country per e vs round (1981, 1990, 1999, and 
2008); higher scores indicate more justificationa, b
1 never
5.5
10 always
1 never
5.5
10 always
1 never
5.5
10 always
1 never
5.5
10 always
1 never
5.5
10 always
1 never
5.5
10 always
1981 1990 1999 2008 1981 1990 1999 2008
1981 1990 1999 2008 1981 1990 1999 2008 1981 1990 1999 2008 1981 1990 1999 2008
Iceland Norway Sweden Finland Denmark
Netherlands Belgium Germany France Great Britain Ireland
N−Ireland Austria
Poland Bulgaria Romania Czech Republic Slovak Republic Slovenia
Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Italy Spain Portugal Malta
 
north
west
south
central/east
a  Appendix B, table 1A shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b  The question in the e vs is: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think 
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between...[homosexuality]’. Answers 
were given on a 10-point scale (1 = never, 10 = always).
Source: e vs’81, e vs’90, e vs’99, e vs’086
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Table 2.1
Percentage of inhabitants thinking that homosexuality is never justified (answer 1)a, 7
 1981 1990 1999 2008
difference last and first year
(percentage points)
Northern Europe
Iceland 48 24 12 6 42
Norway 50 45 - 12 38
Sweden 39 37 9 12 27
Finland - 32 29 16 16
Denmark 38 36 21 12 26
Western Europe
The Netherlands 25 13 7 8 17
Belgium 52 41 27 16 36
Germany 45 36 19 17 28
France 52 40 23 19 33
Great Britain 47 40 25 23 24
Ireland 61 51 38 26 35
Northern Ireland 66 65 42 31 35
Austria - 48 26 25 23
Central/East Europe
Poland - 77 60 53 24
Bulgaria - 80 60 55 25
Romania - 86 80 67 19
Czech Republic - 46 27 28 18
Slovak Republic - 52 24 20 32
Slovenia - 60 42 47 13
Hungary - 73 88 53 20
Estonia - 76 57 64 12
Latvia - 82 77 63 19
Lithuania - 88 78 70 18
Southern Europe
Italy 66 46 30 - 36
Spain 57 47 22 17 40
Portugal - 65 44 30 35
Malta - 83 61 41 42
a  The question in the e vs is: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think 
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between...[homosexuality]’. Answers 
were given on a 10-point scale (1 = never, 10 = always).
Source: e vs’81; e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’08
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Figure 2.3 confirms the previous findings: public attitudes towards homosexuality 
have changed considerably over the last 30 years in Europe. In all countries, without 
 exception, public opinion on homosexuality is more tolerant in 2008 than in 1981/1990. 
To summarize this finding in a very rough way: at the start of the e vs data collection, 
about half the citizens in the participating countries considered homosexuality never 
to be justified. This proportion had shrunk to a third by 2008. On average, rejection of 
homosexuality decreased by about 11 percentage points every nine years. However, the 
pace, timing and direction of the change depends on the specific country.
In the Northern region of Europe, attitudes towards homosexuality were relatively 
tolerant at beginning of e vs data collection and kept on moving towards more toler-
ance subsequently. In 1981, levels of intolerance varied between 38% (Denmark) and 
50% ( Norway) of the population who believed that homosexuality should never be justi-
fied. These percentages subsequently shrank, and now vary between 6% (Iceland) and 
16% (Finland). Tolerance increased in Iceland, in particular: where in 1981, 48% of the 
population considered homosexuality never to be justified, this had dropped to 6% by 
2008. Despite the already relatively tolerant attitudes in 1999, almost all northern coun-
tries (except Sweden) continued to move towards more tolerance between 1999 and 
2008. The lack of progress in Sweden is not very surprising considering the relatively 
high levels of tolerance found in 1999, leaving less scope for further progress.
In 1981, levels of tolerance varied considerably within Western Europe. The percentages 
believing that homosexuality could never be justified ranged from 45% (Germany) to 
66% (Northern Ireland), with the Netherlands being an exception (25%). Nowadays, the 
percentages range from 16% (Belgium) to 31% (Northern Ireland), with the Netherlands 
again being atypical with 8%. The average level of tolerance continued to increase in 
the Western region during all time frames, but many national differences were found. 
Half the Western countries (Belgium, France, Great Britain and Ireland) continued 
to move towards more tolerance between 1999 and 2008, while in the other half (the 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Northern Ireland), the initial progress towards 
more tolerance between 1981 and 1999 came to an end. For some countries, especially 
the Netherlands, the lack of recent progress might be related to high levels of tolerance 
reached in the 1990s. But the lack of progress in Northern Ireland and Austria, where 
between a quarter and a third of the population believe homosexuality can never be 
justified, cannot be attributed to these ‘ceiling effects’.
The Central/Eastern region of Europe joined the e vs for the first time in 1990. In that 
year, the vast majority of the population in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Hun-
gary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania believed that homosexuality could never be justified 
(ranging from 60% in Slovenia to 88% in Lithuania). Regional exceptions were the Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic, with around half the population (46% and 52%, respec-
tively) believing that homosexuality could never be justified. In addition to the initial 
lack of tolerance in this region, there is also a lack of progress over the last nine years, 
with no change in the average level of attitudes in Central/Eastern Europe. Three coun-
tries moved towards more tolerance (Romania, Hungary and Latvia), while in four coun-
tries public opinion stayed the same (Poland, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic and Lithuania), 
and in three countries public opinion became more intolerant (Czech Republic, Slovenia 
e xploring shif t s and differences
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and Estonia). Despite the lack of current progress or recent decrease in tolerance, the 
Slovak Republic and Czech Republic retain their position as relatively tolerant countries 
in Central/Eastern Europe. The current findings in the Baltic countries and Romania are 
more unsettling. The lack of movement towards more tolerance (Lithuania) or even a 
move towards more intolerance (Estonia) leaves these countries with a large majority 
believing that homosexuality can never be justified.
In 1981/1990, the majority of citizens in Southern Europe believed that homosexuality 
could never be justified. The levels of tolerance were comparable to those in Central/
Eastern Europe. This was especially true in Malta, where in 1990 83% of the population 
thought that homosexuality could never be justified. However, in contrast to Central/
Eastern Europe, much has changed in the South. Southern Europe is still not the most 
tolerant region in Europe, but tolerance in all four countries included has increased and 
continued to increase. Intolerant attitudes have fallen by 40 percentage points in Spain 
and 42 percentage points in Malta. This produces current levels of intolerance varying 
between 17% (Spain) and 41% (Malta).
The developments discussed above are summarized in graph form in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4
in 1981 in 1990 in 1999 in 2008
© GEOGRAFIEK, 2013
No data
Percentage of inhabitants thinking that homosexuality is never justied:
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70   100%
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Figure 2.4 (continued)
in 1981 in 1990 in 1999 in 2008
© GEOGRAFIEK, 2013
No data
Percentage of inhabitants thinking that homosexuality is never justied:
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70   100%
Not in my back yard
The item measuring justification of homosexuality taps into abstract beliefs about 
homosexuality. In 1990, a new item reflecting attitudes to homosexual individuals was 
added to the questionnaire. Respondents indicated for various groups of people whether 
they would object to having them as neighbours. This measure reflects people’s accept-
ance of homosexuality at close quarters. 
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Figure 2.5
Mean scores on whether or not participants mention homosexuals as people they do not want as 
neighbours, per region per e vs round; lower scores indicate more tolerant attitudesa, b
north west central/east south
0 not mentioned
0.5
1 mentioned
1990 1999 2008
a  Appendix B, table 1B shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b  The question in the e vs is: ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any 
that you would not like to have as neighbours? ... [homosexuals]’. Answers were given on a 2-point 
scale (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned).
Source: e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’08
Just as the percentages who believe that homosexuality can never be justified have fallen 
over the last 30 years, so increasingly tolerant attitudes are found when the portion of 
the population who cite homosexual individuals as unwanted neighbours is taken in ac-
count. The number of participants indicating that they would not want a gay neighbour 
has fallen in all four European regions. The biggest change took place between 1990 and 
1999. After that, especially in the Central/Eastern region, the trend towards more toler-
ance became less pronounced. Country-level analyses examine the variance between the 
countries within the regions.
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Figure 2.6
Mean scores on whether or not participants mention homosexuals as people they do not want as 
neighbours, per country per e vs round; lower scores indicate more tolerant attitudesa, b
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1 Mentioned
0.5
0 Not mentioned
1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008
1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008
Iceland Sweden Finland Denmark
Netherlands Belgium Germany France Great Britain Ireland
N−Ireland Austria
Poland Bulgaria Romania Czech Republic Slovak Republic Slovenia
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Italy Spain Portugal Malta
north
west
south
central/east
a  Appendix B, table 1B shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b  The question in the e vs is: ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any 
that you would not like to have as neighbours? ... [homosexuals]’. Answers were given on a 2-point 
scale (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned).
Source: e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’088
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Table 2.2
Percentage of inhabitants who mention homosexuals as people they do not want as neighbours9, a
 1990 1999 2008
difference first and last year 
(percentage points)
Northern Europe
Iceland 20 8 2 18
Sweden 18 6 7 15
Finland 25 21 13 12
Denmark 12 8 6 6
Western Europe
The Netherlands 12 6 10 2
Belgium 24 17 7 17
Germany 34 13 17 17
France 24 16 6 18
Great Britain 31 24 10 21
Ireland 33 27 19 14
Northern Ireland 48 35 21 27
Austria 43 25 24 19
Central/Eastern Europe
Poland 71 55 53 18
Bulgaria 68 54 54 14
Romania 75 65 58 17
Czech Republic 51 20 23 28
Slovak Republic 62 44 32 30
Slovenia 43 44 34 9
Estonia 73 46 48 25
Latvia 78 46 44 34
Lithuania 87 68 67 20
Southern Europe
Italy 39 29 23 16
Spain 32 16 5 27
Portugal 50 25 22 28
Malta 44 40 21 23
a  The question in the e vs is: ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any 
that you would not like to have as neighbours? ... [homosexuals]’. Answers were given on a 2-point 
scale (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned).
Source: e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’08
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At country level, the figures show a more tolerant Europe in 2008 than in 1990, with no 
exceptions. On average, the percentage of people not wanting a ‘gay neighbour’ fell by 
11 percentage points every nine years. When the question was introduced in the e vs, 
around 40% of citizens from the countries included mentioned homosexual individuals 
as unwanted neighbours. This percentage had gone down to 25% by 2008. Once again, 
however, levels of tolerance and changes vary widely between countries.
In the early 1990s, in line with the findings regarding the justification of homosexuality, 
no widespread intolerance was found in the North and attitudes became more tolerant 
over time. In 2008, the percentages not wanting homosexual neighbours ranged from 
2% in Iceland to 13% in Finland. Iceland illustrates that high levels of tolerance do not by 
definition hinder progress towards greater tolerance.
In the Western region of Europe, the percentages not wanting a homosexual neighbour 
varied widely in 1990, ranging from 12% in the Netherlands to 48% in Northern Ireland. 
Most of these percentages have fallen substantially over the last 20 years and the region-
al level of tolerance has continued to increase. In 2008, 10% or less reported homosexual 
individuals as unwanted neighbours in four countries (Netherlands, Belgium, France 
and Great Britain), and between 17% and 24% of the population reported this group as 
unwanted neighbours in Germany, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Austria. Focusing on 
more recent changes, the Netherlands and Germany show a (small) increase in intoler-
ance. In the case of the Netherlands, this is probably due to a ‘ceiling effect’. Tolerance 
in four other Western countries rose between 1999 and 2008: Belgium, France, Great 
Britain and Ireland.
In the early 1990s, the majority of the population in the participating Central/Eastern 
countries did not want to have a homosexual neighbour, with Slovenia as the exception 
(43%). In contrast to the figures for justification of homosexuality, none of the Central/
Eastern countries moved towards more intolerance. In 2008, four countries still had a 
majority who rejected having homosexual people as neighbours, but in five countries 
this was no longer the case. The average level of tolerance continued to increase in this 
region, but there are many country-level differences. Latvia (dropping from 78% to 
44% reporting homosexuals as unwanted neighbours) and Slovakia (down from 62% to 
32%) changed substantially. However, in the majority of the Central/Eastern countries 
the change happened between 1990 and 1999 and did not persist.
In line with figures reflecting justification of homosexuality, the attitude towards having 
homosexuals as neighbours have become steadily more tolerant in Southern Europe. 
Around a third (Spain) to half (Portugal) of the population of the countries included in 
the survey did not want homosexual neighbours in 1990. Twenty years later, these per-
centages ranged from 5% (Spain) to 23% (Italy). The change in public attitudes was par-
ticularly marked in Portugal (intolerance down from 50% to 22%) and Spain (from 32% to 
5%). In Italy and Portugal, no further change in attitudes occurred between 1999 and 
2008, while in Spain and Malta tolerance continued to increase.
Figure 2.7 summarizes the findings discussed in the previous section.
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Figure 2.7
in 1990 in 1999 in 2008
© GEOGRAFIEK, 2013
No data
Percentage of inhabitants who mention homosexuals as people they do not want as neighbours:
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in 1990 in 1999 in 2008
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Percentage of inhabitants who mention homosexuals as people they do not want as neighbours:
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Source: e vs ’90, ’99, ’08
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2.2 Focusing on shifts in the last decade
As shown, substantial changes have taken place in public attitudes towards homo-
sexuality in many European countries during the last 30 years, especially between 1990 
and 1999. While the long timespan of almost 30 years is a major benefit of the e vs data, 
one drawback is that the e vs only collects data once every nine years. As a result, e vs 
data do not allow close examination of recent changes in attitudes. The European Social 
Survey (ess) does offer that possibility. Started in 2002, the ess collects data every two 
years. Since the ess also contains an item to measure attitudes to homosexuality (‘gay 
men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish’), the data do permit 
close examination of changes during the first decade of the new millennium.
Figure 2.8
Mean scores on whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish,  
per region per ess round; higher scores indicate more tolerant attitudesa, b
north west central/east south
disagree
strongly
disagree
neither
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strongly
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a  Appendix B, table 1c shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b  The question in ess was: ‘Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements: ... Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as 
they wish’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly).
Source: ess´02; ess’04; ess’06; ess’08; ess’10
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The first decade of the new millennium can be broadly characterized as a period in 
which attitudes towards homosexuality did not change substantially. The regional lines 
 fluctuate a little, but no clear trend towards substantially more tolerance or intolerance 
can be observed. However, the regional-level analysis might overlook differences be-
tween individual countries within regions.
Figure 2.9
Mean scores on whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish; higher 
scores indicate more tolerant attitudes (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly)a, b
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a  Appendix B, table 1c shows which changes in attitudes between years are significant.
b  The question in ess was: ‘Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements: ... Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as 
they wish’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly).
Source: ess´02; ess’04; ess’06; ess’08; ess’10
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Table 2.3
Percentage of inhabitants who believe that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as 
they wish (percentages agree or completely agree)10, a
 year difference first and last year 
(percentage points) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Northern Europe
Norway 76 78 81 79 84 8
Sweden 82 84 86 86 90 8
Finland 62 63 64 68 75 13
Denmark 89 88 88 89 90 1
Western Europe
Netherlands 88 89 88 91 93 5
Belgium 80 79 80 85 87 2
Germany 75 75 71 82 83 8
France 79 76 78 86 83 4
Great Britain 76 76 79 81 85 9
Ireland 83 78 81 86 - 3
Austria 74 71 72 - - 2
Switzerland 80 76 77 82 83 3
Central/Eastern Europe
Poland 46 43 46 51 48 2
Russian Federation - - 31 30 29 -3
Ukraine - 37 31 33 - -4
Bulgaria - - 62 51 55 -7
Czech Republic 60 59 - 66 67 7
Slovak Republic - 47 41 43 - -4
Slovenia 52 55 55 58 53 1
Hungary 48 51 47 44 49 1
Estonia - 42 37 41 43 1
Southern Europe
Greece 51 53 - 52 - 1
Spain 72 74 77 78 82 10
Portugal 74 62 61 66 63 -11
a  The question in ess was: ‘Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements: ... Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as 
they wish’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly).
Source: ess´02; ess’04; ess’06; ess’08; ess’10
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Country-level analyses also show relatively flat lines, indicating a lack of major changes 
in attitudes between 2002 and 2010. Although this general picture applies to all coun-
tries included in the study, some differences between times and places can be found (see 
also Appendix B, table 1C).
In Northern Europe, attitudes were relatively tolerant in 2002 and became more toler-
ant by 2010. No exceptions were found to this trend. Currently, three-quarters or more 
agrees that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. Not all 
change took place at the same time and pace in the various countries.
Comparable shifts were found in Western Europe. In some countries, attitudes become 
more tolerant or intolerant in certain periods, but overall attitudes are relatively stable 
or become slightly more tolerant. Currently, in all Western European countries included 
in the study, more than 80% of the population believes that gay men and lesbian women 
should be free to live their own lives as they wish.11 No country in Western Europe report-
ed a more negative attitude towards homosexuality in 2010 than in 2002, but decreasing 
levels of tolerance were found in several countries during certain periods. In other West-
ern European countries periods of increasing tolerance are found. A lack of movement 
towards more tolerance in some countries is probably due to the already high levels of 
tolerance.
A different picture emerges when shifts in attitudes in Central/Eastern Europe are 
considered. At regional level, attitudes towards homosexuality became more negative 
between 2002 and 2006, after which they became more tolerant between 2006 and 
2010. In most Central/Eastern European countries, attitudes to homosexuality stay at 
the same level – one which can be qualified as relatively intolerant, with a minority or 
a small majority of its citizens agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live 
their own lives as they wish. Exceptions to this overall picture are the Czech Republic 
(67% tolerant) in the tolerant direction, and Ukraine and Russia (33% and 29% tolerant, 
respectively) in the intolerant direction. While no country showed consistently increas-
ing intolerance in attitudes, Ukraine showed a decrease in tolerant attitudes during a 
certain period without a preceding or following increase, and four countries showed no 
changes at all. Two countries had one period of increasingly tolerant attitudes without 
any decrease (Poland and Czech Republic).
The regional picture for Southern Europe shows increases in tolerance between 2004 
and 2006, and again between 2008 and 2010. However, country-level analyses shows 
 dissimilar patterns between the Southern European countries in the study. In Greece, 
nothing changed: in 2002, half the Greek population agreed that gay men and lesbians 
should be free to live their own lives as they wish, and in 2008 this was still the case. 
In Spain, progress towards more tolerance was found, with attitudes to homosexual-
ity turning more tolerant between 2002 and 2006. In Portugal, shifts in attitudes went 
in the other direction, with tolerance levels decreasing between 2002 and 2004 and 
between 2008 and 2010. This resulted in a fall in the percentage of the Portuguese popu-
lation agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they 
wish from 74% to 63%.
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Figure 2.10 presents a graphical summary of the differences between 2002 and 2010.
Figure 2.10
in 2002 in 2010
© GEOGRAFIEK, 2013
No data
Percentage of inhabitants hat believe that gay men and lesbians should 
be free to live their live as they wish (percentages agree or totally agree):
 50 60 70 80 90 100%
Source: ess ’02, ’10
2.3 Summary
Over the last 30 years, all participating European countries have become more toler-
ant. On average, the level of tolerance increases by 11 percentage points every nine 
years. Looking at the e vs data, the biggest change in attitudes took place between 1990 
and 1999. However, the pace and consistency of the change vary considerably between 
 countries. As regards the pace of change, the Slovak Republic and Spain stand out for the 
rapid increase in tolerance. Countries where the rate of change is notably slower, and 
where the lack of change cannot be explained by ceiling effects due to relatively tolerant 
attitudes, are Romania, Slovenia and Hungary. However, whilst changing more slowly, 
Romania does exhibit consistency in the change in attitudes towards more tolerance 
based on the measures for justification and homosexual neighbours in each period stud-
ied. Other countries showing a consistent trend towards tolerance are Iceland, Belgium, 
France, Ireland and Spain.
e xploring shif t s and differences
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No country became consistently more intolerant or stayed at the same level of tolerance 
between 1981/1990 and 2008. However, several countries seem to have undergone a 
change in attitudes in the 1990s but were unable to sustain this increase in tolerance into 
the new millennium, a finding in the e vs data which is supported by ess data showing 
that many countries show no consistent or substantial increase in tolerance between 
2002 and 2010. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the lack of change is prob-
ably due to the already high levels of acceptance reached in earlier decades, leaving less 
scope for progress in the new millennium. In many other countries, however, attitudes 
remained stuck at a relatively intolerant level.
The pace of change, the consistency of change and the starting position of European 
countries in the 1980s and 90s set the scene for attitudes towards homosexuality today. 
In this sense, countries with relatively tolerant attitudes (countries where a fifth of the 
population or less think homosexuality can never be justified and regard homosexuals 
as unwanted neighbours, and where more than three-quarters believe that gay men and 
lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish) are Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Spain. Countries 
in which between a fifth and a third of the population do not think homosexuality can 
ever be justified and/or would not want to live next door to a homosexual person, and 
where a majority believe that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as 
they wish (though this latter attitude is less clear) are Great Britain, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Portugal and Italy. Slovenia and Malta 
are countries where between a third and a half of the population believe homosexuality 
can never be justified and/or would not want a homosexual living next door. Countries 
where a majority think homosexuality can never be justified, would not want to live next 
door to a homosexual individual and do not agree that gay men and lesbians should be 
free to live their own lives as they wish are Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.12
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3 Gender and lgb: hand in hand?
Social acceptance of l gb individuals seems rooted in a broader gender belief system 
that focuses on appropriate pathways and roles for women and men in society. Poli-
cies also often focus on gender and sexual orientation and merge these issues together. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the government department that deals with equality 
and emancipation issues published its latest policy paper under the heading ‘l gbt and 
Gender Equality Policy Plan of the Netherlands 2011 – 2015’, addressing both inequalities 
based on gender and sexual orientation in the same policy plan. Also other countries 
merge their gender and sexual orientation policies.
It is not only policymakers who conflate gender issues and attitudes to homosexuality. 
Empirical studies in several countries (see e.g. Hooghe and Meeusen 2012; McVeigh and 
Diaz 2009; Nierman et al. 2007) or at European level (Takács and Szalma 2011) show a rela-
tionship between traditional attitudes on gender roles and intolerant attitudes regard-
ing homosexuality. For example, a study by Nierman et al. (2007) compared attitudes to 
gay men and lesbian women among American and Chilean students. They found that the 
Chilean students reported more negative attitudes to homosexual men and women than 
the American students, and that this was (partly) due to more conservative gender role 
beliefs amongst Chilean students compared to their American counterparts. The study 
by Hooghe and Meeusen (2012) surveyed a sample of Belgian adolescents at the age of 16, 
and again when the respondents were 18 and 21 years old. They concluded that a tradi-
tional view of gender roles was strongly related to attitudes towards homosexuality, and 
those adolescents who became more conservative in their gender viewpoints reported 
accompanying increases in negative attitudes regarding homosexuality.
This chapter examines the relationship between attitudes towards homosexuality, gen-
der role beliefs, and macro-level gender equality indicators. If this relationship exists, 
it would provide support for the merging of policies and point to important factor in 
determining attitudes towards homosexuality. Using e vs data from 2008, questions 
are addressed such as to what degree traditional gender beliefs go hand in hand with 
intolerant attitudes towards homosexuality in various countries, and whether citizens 
of countries that are conceived as feminine countries or countries with gender equality 
report relatively tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality.
3.1 Attitudes towards homosexuality and gender roles
One way to examine the relationship between attitudes towards gender roles and homo-
sexuality is to examine correlations. A correlation is a single number that indicates the 
degree to which two aspects are related to each other.13 The analyses for this section 
examine the correlation between a measure (‘factor’) that is based on six questions 
regarding women and paid employment and a measure based on two items regarding 
homosexuality.14 Since only the data collected in 2008 were used, more countries could 
be included in these analyses than could be included in the analyses in chapter 2.
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Figure 3.1
Relationship between attitudes towards gender roles and attitudes towards homosexualitya
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a  See Appendix B for a list of country abbreviations.
Source: e vs’08
A strong correlation (r = .56) was found at country level between average attitudes 
towards gender roles and average attitudes towards homosexuality indicating that 
countries in which people hold traditional beliefs about the appropriate role of women 
in households and working situations less often consider homosexuality justifiable and 
more often cite homosexual individuals as unwanted neighbours. Countries with intol-
erant attitudes towards homosexuality and conservative attitudes towards gender roles 
are clustered in the lower left corner of figure 3.1. Examples of such countries are Turkey, 
Greece, Russian Federation and Lithuania. The opposite (upper right) sector of figure 3.1, 
contains countries with tolerant attitudes on homosexuality and liberal  attitudes on 
gender roles, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and the Netherlands. The re-
maining countries are situated between these two corners. For example, countries such 
as Portugal, Austria and Slovak Republic, which report average attitudes on gender roles 
and homosexuality, are found in the middle area of the figure. No outliers were found 
such as countries which combine strong negative attitudes towards homosexuality with 
liberal attitudes towards gender roles or vice versa.
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3.2 Attitudes towards homosexuality and the Gender Equality Index
There are several measures which are used to portray inequalities in the participation 
of women in society, such as gaps in education, jobs, power and health. For the present 
study, the Gender Equality Index (gei) compiled by Social Watch was selected to examine 
the associations with attitudes towards homosexuality.15 The gei is based on gender 
inequity indicators in three dimensions: education (gender gaps in enrolment at all 
levels and in literacy), economic participation (gender gaps in income and employment) 
and empowerment (gender gaps in highly qualified jobs, parliament and senior execu-
tive positions). Scores are calculated on a scale from 0 (e.g. where no woman has a job or 
an income) to 100 (e.g. perfect equality in job and income distribution).
Figure 3.2
Relationship between justification of homosexuality and Gender Equality Index, 2008a
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Source: e vs’08; Social Watch16
There is a relationship between a country’s average attitude towards homosexuality 
and the gei. The gei shows a medium to strong relationship with average country-level 
attitudes regarding the justifiability of homosexuality (r = .47) and with attitudes to 
homosexual neighbours (r = -.49). In countries where women and men are more equal 
in terms of education, economic participation and empowerment, public opinion on 
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homosexuality is more tolerant. For example, as illustrated in figure 3.2, countries with 
relatively high equality of women and men (as indicated by a gei score of around 80 or 
higher) all report high scores on justification of homosexuality. An example of such a 
country is Sweden, with a gei score of 89 and 12% reporting that they believe homo-
sexuality can never be justified (7% of the population indicated that they would not 
want homosexual people as neighbours). Following these countries with relatively high 
levels of gender equality and tolerant attitudes to homosexuality is a group of countries 
reporting average attitudes to homosexuality and somewhat lower gei scores (ranging 
from 70 to 75). An example of these countries is Austria (25% think homosexuality can 
never be justified, 24% want no homosexual neighbours, gei score 73). The associa-
tion between a relatively low gei score and intolerant attitudes holds true for Turkey, 
Albania, Azerbaijan and Greece. For example, the gei score of Turkey is 45 and 84% of its 
population report that homosexuality can never be justified. However, the association 
seems to be weaker for other countries with relatively low levels of acceptance of homo-
sexuality such as Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries. Like the ‘average 
attitude countries’, these countries have gei scores of between 70 and 75 (as high as 
76 and 77, respectively, for Lithuania and Latvia), but report lower levels of acceptance 
of homo sexuality (e.g. more than 50% of the population think homosexuality can never 
be justified). The association is also weaker in Luxembourg and Switzerland, which com-
bine relatively low gei scores (61 and 63, respectively) with relatively tolerant attitudes 
towards homosexuality (17% in Luxembourg and 20% in Switzerland indicate that homo-
sexuality can never be justified).
3.3 Attitudes towards homosexuality and the masculinity/femininity dimension
When people are discussing societal gender issues, they often refer to the work of Hof-
stede. Hofstede analyzed the values of a sample of ibm employees recruited between 
1967 and 1973 in a large number of countries. Based on his data, he constructed six 
cultural dimensions which are used to categorize cultures and societies. One of these 
dimensions is the masculinity/femininity dimension. Masculine societies are societies 
with a preference for achievement, competition, assertiveness, success and material 
rewards. Feminine societies stand for a focus on cooperation, consensus, modesty, 
caring for others and valuing quality of life above material goods. Masculinity and 
femininity together form two poles of one scale ranging from 0 (feminine societies) 
to 100 (masculine  societies). Although this classification is not related to actual gender 
issues or gender gaps in society, the frequency with which these dimensions are used 
and the fact that they are often perceived as reflecting masculinity or femininity begs the 
question of whether they are related to attitudes towards homosexuality.
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Figure 3.3
Relationship between justification of homosexuality and masculinity/femininity dimensiona
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Source: e vs 2008; Geert Hofstede17, 18
In contrast to the results with gei and gender attitudes, no relationship was found 
between Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimensions and country-level attitudes 
towards homosexuality. There is a weak relationship between the attitude towards jus-
tification of homosexuality (r = -.15), and no relationship with not wanting homosexual 
people as neighbours (r = .05). The lack of a clear relationship between the two measures 
can also be seen in figure 3.3. In some countries, the culture is indeed feminine and at-
titudes are relatively tolerant. For example, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Finland are all feminine societies with high levels of tolerance. But Slovenia, 
Estonia, Romania and Portugal are also relatively feminine, and those countries do not 
have highly tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality. In Hungary, relatively high mas-
culine scores do indeed go hand-in-hand with the country’s relatively negative attitudes 
to homosexuality. But Austria, Switzerland, Ireland and Great Britain are also relatively 
masculine countries without accompanying negative attitudes on homosexuality.
3.4 Merging gender and lgb issues?
The current study confirms results from previous smaller-scale studies: attitudes towards 
gender and towards homosexuality are related. The way in which countries deal with 
gender and lgb: hand in hand?
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gender issues is related to public opinion on homosexuality. A relationship was found on 
two aspects: a strong relationship with average attitudes towards gender roles in coun-
tries and a moderate relationship with a country’s gei score.19
To begin with the former, the our analyses showed that countries with liberal attitudes 
to gender roles also show a high level of tolerance of homosexuality. By contrast, in 
countries whose citizens believe that working mothers are not good for children, that 
women do not really want to work but would rather stay home, and that there is no value 
in achieving female independence through work, homosexuals are more often cited as 
unwanted neighbours and homosexuality is thought not to be justifiable. The analyses 
showed no exceptions to this rule (for example, a country with liberal gender attitudes 
but intolerant attitudes to homosexuality) and revealed that the relationship between 
attitudes towards gender roles and homosexuality was strong. Before jumping to conclu-
sions, however, three critical comments need to be made in interpreting this finding.
First, whilst it is in line with existing literature that traditional gender attitudes are 
 related to attitudes towards homosexuality, it might also be the case that it is not the 
gender aspect but the traditionality of the attitudes that explains the strong interrelation-
ship. It remains to be seen whether negative attitudes towards homosexuality are, for 
example, are also related to other traditional attitudes such as attitudes towards abor-
tion and euthanasia.
The second critical comment is that it might also be argued that gender attitudes and 
attitudes towards homosexuality are manifestations of the same construct: a low toler-
ance of gender deviance. It has been argued that a negative attitude to homosexuality 
stems from a low tolerance of gender deviance and a preference for strict gender role 
adherence. In that sense, negative attitudes to homosexuality are negative attitudes 
towards gender (deviance). These attitudes are in other words one and the same thing 
and reflect whether or not people accept that not everyone adheres to prescribed tradi-
tional gender roles (e.g. women should raise children; people should love opposite-sex 
partners; women should not work outside the home; people should not have sex with 
same-sex partners; and so on). Whilst the current correlation of .56 between gender 
attitudes and attitudes towards homosexuality does not suggest that both attitudes are 
measuring the same thing, a broader operationalization of attitudes towards gender, 
including more sensitive measures concerning gender deviant behaviours or attitudes, 
should inform this line of reasoning.
The final critical comment is that attitudes to gender and attitudes to homosexuality 
might both be manifestations of the same underlying value orientations. An example 
of such an underlying orientation is post-materialism. Post-materialistic values are 
 values in which quality of life, social issues and self-expression are considered impor-
tant (Inglehart 1977). Liberal attitudes towards gender and homosexuality are then both 
 specific expressions of a post-materialistic value orientation, and this could explain their 
relationship. It remains to be seen whether the relationship between attitudes towards 
gender and homosexuality remains after controlling for post-materialistic values. It is 
therefore important to assess the relevance of gender issues in a more elaborative 
framework, which also includes other factors such as value orientations. This issue is 
addressed in Chapter 4.
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A moderate to strong relationship was found between a country’s gei score and public 
opinion on homosexuality. In countries with a high gei score, i.e. countries with small 
gender gaps in education, literacy levels, income, employment and participation in 
highly qualified jobs such as a seat in parliament or a senior executive function, aver-
age attitudes towards homosexuality are relatively tolerant. However, the gei is less 
predictive in Central/Eastern European countries where country-level attitudes to homo-
sexuality are relatively intolerant but average gei scores (compared to other European 
countries) were found.
One gender aspect that was not related to the attitudes towards homosexuality was the 
cultural dimension masculinity/femininity. A very low correlation was found with the 
masculinity index and attitudes towards homosexuality, and no clear picture emerged. 
There are indeed countries that are feminine and report high levels of tolerance, just as 
there are countries with high levels of masculinity and low levels of tolerance. However, 
there are also countries which are characterized as feminine but where public opinion 
about homosexuality is rather negative, and there are countries which are perceived as 
masculine but where relatively tolerant attitudes are found.
An explanation for the seemingly conflicting attitudes towards gender and gei on the 
one hand and Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimension on the other may be found 
in the ‘genderlessness’ of the Hofstede dimension. Hofstede used the labels ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine’ to characterize certain cultural aspects of societies such as achievement, 
assertiveness, modesty, caring for others, and so on. While these characteristics are 
often perceived as being male or female attributes, they are not related to gender aspects 
per se. In fact, one could argue that calling attributes such as achievement and assertive-
ness masculine and calling attributes such as modesty and caring for others feminine 
is a reflection of a traditional way of thinking about gender, rather than of ‘masculine’ 
or ‘feminine’ cultural dimensions of a society. In this sense, the masculinity/femininity 
dimension of Hofstede has little to do with gender.
e xpl aining differences
39 
4 Explaining differences
Differences between countries and shifts in attitudes towards homosexuality do no hap-
pen or exist in a social vacuum. They are intertwined with ongoing cultural, economic, 
demographic and political situations. Several studies have already investigated these 
influences empirically. Their titles illustrate the factors that have received attention: 
Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: The role of religion and cultural context (Adamczyk and 
Pitt 2009), Cohort differences in tolerance of homosexuality (Anderson and Fetner 2008a) or 
Economic inequality and intolerance: Attitudes towards homosexuality in 35 democracies (Ander-
son and Fetner 2008b). This chapter summarizes the factors that are associated with 
attitudes to homosexuality and have received empirical and theoretical support. Only 
studies comparing different places and/or times are included. After summarizing the 
existing literature on explanations for differences and shifts, we explore whether coun-
try differences in attitudes are related to factors reported in previous studies and gender 
measures based on multi-level analysis. We conduct the analyses using data from e vs 
2008 and therefore focus only on differences between countries, not on differences over 
time.20 While the overview of the literature, also provides explanations for differences 
between time intervals, therefore, the main research question focuses on explaining 
differences between countries.
The factors from the existing literature are grouped in three categories: social econom-
ics, religion, and policies and politics.
4.1 Social economics
Europe has undergone deep-rooted changes in economic, political and social life during 
recent decades, with different changes taking place in different countries in different 
periods. These changes affect people’s attitudes to non-conventional groups such as 
l gb individuals. Modernization is a broad term covering various interrelated processes 
which all play a role in explaining differences in attitudes. Modernization processes that 
have received substantial empirical attention in relation to attitudes towards homo-
sexuality are shifting value orientations in prosperous times, increasing urbanization, 
and rising levels of education. These processes receive empirical support in studies 
comparing various times and various places. For the sake of clarity, the modernization 
processes are discussed separately here, but in reality they are often interrelated (e.g. 
rising education levels lead to shifts in value orientations, etc.).
Value orientations and prosperity
One important aspect of modernization is increasing income and prosperity and 
decreasing levels of economic insecurity. Increasing levels of prosperity are related to 
shifts in general value orientations. Inglehart (1977) argued that as nations move towards 
more industrialization and modernization, people’s value orientations change accord-
ingly. Prosperity allows people to shift their attention from material concerns related 
to physical and economic security (such as food, shelter and safety) to post-materialist 
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 concerns related to quality of life, social issues and self-expression. This shift in con-
cerns is accompanied by viewpoints that are more rational, tolerant and trusting of 
dissimilar others. Inglehart (1977) calls these value dimensions survival values versus 
self-expression values. Using data from the World Value Survey, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) 
showed that greater endorsement of survival values rather than self-expression values 
was indeed associated with more disapproval of homosexuality. Gerhards (2010) and 
Hadler (2012) came to the same conclusion.
Prosperity and austerity
A relationship between prosperity and differences in attitudes towards homosexuality 
is also found in many other studies. Several studies show that tolerance is related to the 
income level of a country, to the income level of individuals, to unemployment status 
and to social class (Anderson and Fetner 2008a; Anderson and Fetner, 2008; Hadler 2012; 
McVeigh and Diaz 2009; Van den Akker et al. 2012; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009; Takács and 
Szalma 2011). Countries with lower income levels, individuals who earn less income, 
individuals who are unemployed and individuals who belong to the working class hold 
relatively negative attitudes to homosexuality. Interestingly, Anderson and Fetner (2008) 
conclude from their study of 35 Western democracies that income inequality within 
countries is a more important predictor of intolerance than economic development 
itself. While richer countries do indeed foster tolerance, not everyone is affected in the 
same way and those in a less secure position (such as working-class people and people 
with lower incomes) are more negative about homosexuality. Economic prosperity is 
related to attitudes towards homosexuality in the middle and upper classes, but not the 
working class. The authors conclude that both inequality across nations and inequality 
within nations are related to intolerance and that social tolerance is likely to be highest 
in rich societies where the benefits of economic prosperity are relatively equally distrib-
uted among all citizens.
Urbanization
Another aspect of modernization that is related to attitudes towards homosexuality is 
the degree of urbanization. In advanced modern societies, more people live in urban 
areas than in rural areas. Several studies have shown that people living in urban areas 
report more tolerant attitudes to homosexuality than people living in more rural areas 
(Anderson and Fetner, 2008b; Van den Akker et al. 2012; Anderson and Fetner 2008a; 
Van den Akker et al 2012; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009; Ohlander et al. 2005). Anderson 
and Fetner (2008) explained this by arguing that large city-dwellers more often perceive 
themselves to be part of a larger and more diverse world and have more contact with 
people who are dissimilar to them. People living in small towns, villages or the coun-
tryside are more often in contact with people similar to themselves and more involved 
in community issues. The lack of familiarity with outsider groups explains the finding 
that rural residents seem to be less tolerant towards l gb people. Interestingly, Takács 
and Szalma (2011) found a different result when examining data gathered in 2008 in 
26 European countries: they reported the highest level of acceptance in suburbs of large 
cities, and the lowest levels among residents of large cities. They explain their findings 
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by  arguing that more l gb people live in suburbs and these areas seem to have developed 
more in the way of l gb infrastructure, while large cities have a higher concentration of 
immigrants who are known to hold relatively negative attitudes towards l gb s.
An explanation for the contradictory findings and lines of reasoning is that the relation-
ship between attitudes and degree of urbanization depends on the national and local 
situation. For example, in countries with a strong l gb community which is concentrated 
in the areas surrounding the large cities, the line of reasoning taken by Takács and 
 Szalma (2011) is valid, while in countries with low levels of l gb infrastructure (i.e. l gb 
bars, clubs or community centres) or a relatively intolerant population, the arguments 
put forward by Anderson and Fetner (2008) make more sense.
High levels of education
The final aspect of modernization that is frequently addressed in research seeking to 
get to the roots of negative attitudes towards homosexuality is education. Expansion of 
education is one of the key processes of modernization (Inglehart, 1977). Many studies 
have shown that increasing educational attainment over time or educational differences 
between countries are associated with greater acceptance of homosexuality (Anderson 
and Fetner, 2008b; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Van den Akker et al. 2012; Anderson and 
Fetner 2008a; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Loftus 2001; McVeigh and Diaz 2009; Ohlander 
et al. 2005; Takács and Szalma 2011). Ohlander et al. (2005) provide an overview of the 
ways in which educational levels influence attitudes towards homosexuality. Educa-
tional systems act as socializing agents, and attending school, college and/or university 
increases general knowledge, enhances critical thinking and expands people’s frame of 
reference. This in turn induces tolerance of heterogeneity, new ideas or beliefs and non-
conventional groups. Higher education also exposes people to different lifestyles and 
different norms and values from those they encounter at home. In addition, educational 
differences are reflected in what people watch or read, and this also influences differenc-
es in attitudes. Finally, universities offer a liberal environment and more opportunities 
to interact with l gb people.
To summarize, various assets of modernization and socioeconomic developments are 
related to attitudes towards homosexuality. When people’s value orientations can be 
defined as post-materialistic, when levels of income are high and levels of unemploy-
ment low, when wealth is spread relatively evenly across countries, when people live in 
urban areas, and when educational levels are relatively high, more tolerant attitudes to 
homosexuality can be expected. These factors explain differences in attitudes between 
different times and places.
4.2 Religion
Religion is a frequently cited factor both in research and in the public debate on the 
‘causes’ of negative attitudes towards homosexuality. Discussions about the relationship 
between religion and attitudes to homosexuality can often be summarized by stat-
ing that religious people are more disapproving of homosexuality than non-religious 
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 people. However, several nuances should be taken into consideration here. First, not 
every religious denomination holds the same negative viewpoints towards homo-
sexuality. While most of the religious scriptures are not very supportive of same-sex 
sexual relations, denominations differ in the degree of literal interpretation of the 
scriptures, adherence to those scriptures and obedience in following their religious 
leaders (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Van den Akker et al. 2012). Several studies find differ-
ences in attitudes to homosexuality between different denominations. At global level, 
Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) showed that the attitudes of people with Protestant or  Muslim 
religious affiliations are more negative than the attitudes of people with Catholic, 
 Jewish, Hindu or Buddhist affiliations. In the European context, Van den Akker et al. 
(2012) showed that Muslim individuals disapproved of homosexuality the most. People 
with a Protestant or Eastern Orthodox religion disapprove of homosexuality more than 
non-religious people while, much to the surprise of Van den Akker et al. and contrary to 
other  surveys,  Catholic and Jewish people disapproved of homosexuality less than non-
religious people. Gerhards (2010), using data from 2000 for the 27 eu member states and 
Turkey, showed that followers of Eastern Orthodox religions, Catholics and Muslims held 
more negative attitudes than Protestants. The diverging findings of these studies can be 
explained by differences in the reference groups used in the analyses (some studies com-
pare religious individuals of various denominations with each other, while other studies 
compare religious and non-religious individuals) and differences between religions in 
various social contexts (e.g. Protestantism can be more or less conservative depending 
on the national context).
Other studies concerning the relationship between religion and attitudes towards 
homosexuality have shown that denomination is not the most important factor when 
trying to explain those attitudes, and that frequency of attendance at religious services 
has a bigger impact (Anderson and Fetner, 2008b; Van den Akker et al. 2012; Yang, 1997; 
Gerhards 2010). Religious people who attend religious services frequently hold less 
 permissive attitudes to homosexuality, regardless of whether they attend churches, 
synagogues or mosques.
In addition to individual religious beliefs, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) argue that the 
 religious context of a nation influences individual attitudes towards homosexuality 
beyond an individual’s own religious beliefs. For example, in countries with a strong 
dominant religion, the religious denomination also exerts an influence on culture, poli-
tics and the public debate. Therefore, people do not have to attend the religious services 
themselves in order to be influenced by the viewpoints of the dominant religion. Adam-
czyk and Pitt show that even people who are not personally religious are influenced by 
the religious tradition of the country in which they live. For example, people living in 
Muslim-majority countries or Protestant-majority countries are more disapproving of 
homosexuality than people living in Hindu, Buddhist or Catholic-majority countries, 
regardless of their own religious beliefs.
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4.3 Policies and politics
lgb policies
As noted in chapter 1, laws, politics and attitudes are intertwined with each other, 
although it is not clear where the premises lie. Many studies have found a relation-
ship between tolerant public attitudes and l gb equality and non-discrimination laws 
and policies (Lax and Phillips 2009; Loftus 2001; Riggle et al. 2010; Takács and Szalma 
2011; Van den Akker et al. 2012). Takács and Szalma (2011) show that public attitudes are 
influenced by the introduction of legislation, with attitudes towards homosexuality 
improving after the introduction of l gb laws. Other authors argue that the way in which 
policies are designed and framed shapes the public discourse and opinions about certain 
issues (Bröer 2006). Lax and Phillips (2009) argue the other way around, and suggest that 
attitudes do not follow legislative introductions, but lead to changes in the law. Lax and 
Philips explored the level of public support that is necessary to achieve a 50% chance 
of changing certain policies or laws in the us. They showed that the amount of public 
support typically needed for a policy change depends on the specific issue at hand. For 
example, to have a 50% chance of policy adoption in the us, 50% public support would 
be needed in the case of same-sex relationships, but public support would need to 
be 75% to obtain a 50% chance of hate crime policies being introduced. Interestingly, 
they also show that the level of public support (as measured by public attitudes) greatly 
depends on the salience of the topic under consideration. For more salient issues, 
i.e. issues that are prominent in the public discourse, politicians will more often take 
public attitudes into account and laws will more often follow the majority preference. 
As Burnstein nicely summarized, the government is expected to do ‘what the people 
want in those instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its wishes 
known’ (1981: 295, as noted by Lax and Phillips 2009). Lax and Phillips (2009) do indeed 
show, based on us opinion polls and policymaking, that roughly 57% support is needed 
on issues where salience is high and around 73% where salience is low. Another related 
factor is the existence of powerful conservative (religious) interest groups. When these 
groups are in place, policies are more related to conservative majorities and less to liber-
al ones. Conservative majorities are much more likely to obtain their desired outcomes, 
policies and laws. Whilst the study by Lax and Phillips is illustrative for the possible rela-
tionship between attitudes and policies, it remains in question whether the results hold 
true in other countries with different political configurations (i.e. political systems with 
multiple-party coalitions instead of the two-party system in the us).
Political systems and the eu
It is not only l gb laws and policies that are related to changes over time or differences 
between localities; broader national political systems also play a role. Anderson and 
Fetner (2008) report that in post-communist countries, public attitudes towards homo-
sexuality are relatively negative. They note that this relationship is not simply explained 
by differences in economic development, since their analyses controlled for these fac-
tors. The explanation they offer is that due to their communist past, these countries 
might be more likely to have lower levels of social trust, a smaller l gb social movement, 
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and a Church that plays a major role in the public sphere. This explains the relatively 
negative attitudes to non-conventional groups such as l gb individuals. Other authors 
have also shown a relationship between a state-socialist or communist past and more 
negative public opinion on homosexuality (Hadler 2012; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009; 
Takács and Szalma 2011).
Another aspect of the political system that Hadler (2012) showed to be related to 
increasingly tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality, using data from 1990-2010 for 
32 European countries, is length of eu membership. His results show that intolerance of 
homosexual people decreases with increasing length of eu membership. He argues that 
eu membership is important because of the Copenhagen criteria stating that the rights 
of minorities must be respected in member states and candidate member states.
It is not only broad political systems and laws that are related to attitudes towards homo-
sexuality; individual political viewpoints are also found to be related to those attitudes 
in studies that compare countries or times: right-wing authoritarianism and more con-
servative political values are associated with more negative attitudes (Van den Akker et 
al. 2012; Hadler 2012; Ohlander et al. 2005; Takács and Szalma 2011).
Civil and lgb movements
A further potentially important factor is the international linkage to the global civil 
society. A global network of governmental and nongovernmental organizations affects 
local attitudes and policies. The degree to which a country has internal linkage with 
these organizations focusing on human rights and minorities has an influence on social 
tolerance in that country. Hadler (2012) shows that intolerance of homosexual people 
does indeed decrease with increasing international linkage (especially with ing os), 
but acknowledges that this could also be a bottom-up process: (I)ng o’s might be more 
active in countries were relatively tolerant public attitudes make it possible to exist and 
take action.
It is not just linkage to global civil society that is important; the local or national l gb 
movement exerts an influence on public opinion on homosexuality as well. McVeigh 
and Diaz (2009) analyzed us data on voting to ban same-sex marriage and concluded 
that countries (states) in which at least one l gb organization is in place there is less 
opposition to same-sex marriage (the presence of general civil rights organizations did 
not exhibit this relationship). Adam et al. (1999) describe the development of local and 
national l gb movements in several countries. They describe the strategies used by the 
l gb movements, the goals pursued and the effect and success they achieved. Although 
there are similarities between countries, each country has its own country-specific path 
along which the l gb movement progresses and on which issues they focus. Several l gb 
movements have focused explicitly on changing public opinion – with greater or lesser 
success. Many factors are important in explaining the impact of l gb organizations. 
In some countries these organizations are more or less forced to present themselves as a 
sexual minority, while in others they are part of a broad movement for human rights and 
equality. In the latter situation, changing the attitude towards homosexuality is part of a 
broader struggle or social movement.
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4.4 Cohort replacement
Loftus reasoned that increasingly tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality are 
explained by a changing ‘demographic makeup’ (2001: 762). When changes in demo-
graphic factors explain changes in attitudes, attitudes do not really change; the only 
thing that changes is the makeup of a population, which simply contains more people 
with demographic characteristics that are associated with more liberal attitudes. One 
of the most frequently discussed factors in this regard is cohort replacement. It is often 
argued that increasingly tolerant attitudes are due to the replacement of older, conserva-
tive generations with younger and more tolerant generations. Inglehart (1977) called this 
‘the silent revolution’. Indeed, many cross-national or time-series studies have shown 
that people in older cohorts hold more negative attitudes to homosexuality (Adamczyk 
and Pitt 2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008a; Van den Akker et al. 2012; Gerhards 2010; 
Hadler 2012; McVeigh and Diaz 2009; Takács and Szalma 2011). In itself, however, cohort 
replacement offers no explanation for why attitudes differ. The real explanations lie 
mainly in the factors associated with cohort replacement: older birth cohorts grew up in 
‘less modern times’, that is to say, in times when levels of prosperity were lower, survival 
values were more important, people more often lived in rural areas, people had more 
limited access to education, hierarchical religious denominations played a bigger role in 
everyday life, many countries were not eu members, l gb organisations had little visibil-
ity, and so on. These processes and societal circumstances lead to less tolerant attitudes 
towards homosexuality among older birth cohorts.
In addition, researchers have noted that the changes in the last 30 years in attitudes to 
homosexuality have been too large and too rapid to be explained solely by the replace-
ment of conservative cohorts. Several authors conclude that while differences between 
cohorts do exist, changes are also taking place within all cohorts (Anderson and Fet-
ner 2008b; De Graaf 2008),with attitudes becoming more tolerant over time within all 
cohorts. Older generations have also shown a leap towards more tolerant attitudes to 
homosexuality. It therefore seems that progress towards more tolerant attitudes or dif-
ferences between countries cannot be explained simply by claiming that older, more 
conservative cohorts are being replaced by younger, more tolerant ones.
4.4 Empirical test
In order to examine whether the factors that influence attitudes towards homosexuality 
hold true in the e vs data 2008 and explain differences in attitudes between countries, 
and also whether the gender indicators (see chapter 3) add additional explanations of 
country-level differences, a multi-level analysis was performed. Multi-level analyses 
explain differences in outcomes at country level and individual level simultaneously. 
For example, multi-level analyses are used to examine whether differences in atti-
tudes between people living in different countries are explained by income levels 
in these countries or by the presence of a dominant religious denomination. Whilst 
individual-level variables such as age are included, the focus of the current analysis lies 
on country-level explanations. In other words: how much of the difference in attitudes 
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between people is explained by their country of residence, and can the factors studied 
offer explanations for this? Are there still differences in attitudes between people in 
different countries when factors such as social economics, modernization, religion, 
 politics and gender issues are taken in account? Or are the differences in attitudes 
between citizens of different countries mainly explained by these factors?
Several individual measures were included in the analysis: gender, self-expression 
values, unemployment, income, urbanization, education, religious denomination, 
importance of religion, cohort, political orientation and gender attitudes. Country-level 
measures are gross domestic product (gdp) per capita, degree of income inequality with-
in countries (gini coefficient), presence of a dominant religion, communist past, length 
of eu membership and Gender Equality Index (gei) score. The multilevel analysis was 
performed in seven steps, each adding a new cluster of variables to the model. Model 1 is 
the empty baseline model; Model 2 adds prosperity factors; Model 3 adds the moderniza-
tion factors urbanization and education; Model 4 adds religious factors; Model 5 adds 
age; Model 6 adds political factors; and Model 7 adds gender issues.
Table 4.1 
Multi-level analyses exploring justification of homosexuality in different European countries
factor model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
female (ref. male) + + + + + +
self-expression values (ref. materialist)
mixed + + + + + +
post-materialist + + + + + +
unemployed (ref. employed) + + + + + +
incomea + + + + + +
gdp per capitab + + + + 0 0
ginic - - - - - -
urbanizationd + + + + +
education (ref. low)
middle + + + + +
high + + + + +
religious denomination  
(ref. no denomination)
free - - - -
muslim - - - -
orthodox - - - 0
various - - - -
protestant 0 0 0 0
roman catholic - - - 0
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Table 4.1 (continued)
factor model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
importance religione + + + +
religion country (ref. no majority)
> 70% roman catholic 0 0 0 0
> 70% protestant 0 0 0 -
> 70% orthodox 0 0 0 0
> 70% no religion - - 0 0
age (ref. 15-24 years)
25-34 years 0 0 0
35-44 years - - -
45-54 years - - -
54-65 years - - -
> 65 years - - -
political orientationf - -
communist past  
(ref. no communist past) - -
length of eu membership in years 0 0
attitude towards genderg -
Gender Equality Indexh 0
% unexplained variance at country level 28.8 7.2 7.7 7.0 7.9 5.3 2.8
Note. A + indicates a significant positive relationship between the factor and the attitude towards 
homosexuality; a - indicates a negative relationship and 0 indicates no significant relationship.
The dependent variable is the attitude to justification of homosexuality; higher scores indicate more 
justification.
a  Higher scores indicate higher income
b Higher gdp indicates more country-level income
c  Higher gini indicates more income inequality within a country
d  Higher scores indicate more urbanized residential area
e  Higher scores indicate more importance attached to religion
f  Higher scores indicate more political affiliation with right wing
g  Higher scores indicate more conservative gender attitudes
h  Higher gei score indicates more gender equality in education, economic participation and power
Source: e vs’08, Social Watch, United Nations Development Programme, Eurostat, European Union, c ia 
World Factbook
The multi-level analysis confirmed almost all the findings from the literature. The final 
model shows that more tolerant attitudes are related to gender (being a woman), more 
modern value orientations, having a job, higher levels of income, less income inequality 
within the country, more urbanized living areas, higher educational levels, considering 
religion less important, being younger than 35 years, having left-wing political orienta-
tions, and not having a communist past.
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A few factors did not make a significant contribution to our model. Contrary to  previous 
research findings, a country’s gdp was found not to be related to attitudes towards 
homosexuality. This can be explained by the inclusion of the gini coefficient. It has 
been argued that the degree of income inequality in a country (gini) is more predictive 
of attitudes to homosexuality than the actual levels of income (gdp). Religious denomi-
nation also yielded different results from what was expected (Orthodox, Protestant, and 
Roman Catholic denominations do not report more negative attitudes to homosexuality 
than the category ‘no religious denomination’). This can be explained by the inclusion 
of the importance of religion in the model, which has been suggested as being more 
important than the religious denomination as such. The lack of significance of macro-
level religious influence could also be explained by including the importance attached to 
religion, or by the simplicity of the measure included in the model. Lastly, length of eu 
membership also made no significant contribution to the model.
Chapter 3 showed that attitudes to gender and gei are related to country-level attitudes 
towards homosexuality when they are considered without taking other factors into 
account. The importance of assessing the relevance of gender issues in a more elabora-
tive framework, which also included other factors such as modernization processes, was 
pointed out in the concluding section of chapter 3. The analysis performed here showed 
that attitudes to gender roles are also related to attitudes to homosexuality in a model 
that controls for other factors. However, gei did not make a unique contribution to the 
model; the relationship between gei and attitudes to homosexuality found in chapter 3 
was explained by the relationship between gei and other factors. Attitudes towards 
gender do explain some of the differences in attitudes towards homosexuality.
When looking at the explained variance in the different models at country level, the 
analysis shows that almost 29% of the differences in attitudes to homosexuality is 
explained by the country in which people live. The lion’s share of the differences at 
country level is explained by factors included in the model. When controlling for dif-
ferences in levels of prosperity (i.e. self-expression values, unemployment, income, 
gdp and gini), only 7% of the differences in attitudes is still explained by the country 
in which people live. This percentage stays at around 7% when other modernization 
factors, religion, and age are included. The percentage drops to 5% when policies and 
politics ( political orientation, communist past and length of eu membership) are 
included, and to 3% when gender issues (attitudes to gender roles and gei) are fed into 
the model, thereby illustrating that these factors also explain additional variance in 
attitudes between countries. In the final model (Model 7) all factors included are taken 
in account. In this model, only 3% of the variation in attitudes towards homosexuality is 
still explained by the country in which people live. In other words, after including these 
factors and controlling for differences in factors such as modernization, religion, poli-
cies and politics and gender issues, differences in attitudes to homosexuality between 
countries become very small.21
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4.5 Conclusion
A myriad of factors are related to changes in attitudes over time and differences 
between countries. Results of previous studies show that the rise of more tolerant atti-
tudes towards homosexuality in Europe since 1981 that we noted in chapter 2 is partly 
explained by modernization processes, religious factors and policies and politics. Coun-
tries are moving from survival to self-expression concerns, cities are expanding rapidly, 
income and educational levels are rising, the (online) possibilities to link to the global 
civil society have increased greatly, the l gb movement is expanding enormously, strict 
adherence to organized religion is declining, communism and state-authoritarianism 
have been abolished, and many countries are (long-term) members of the eu. These 
processes are all related to progress towards more tolerant attitudes to homosexuality.
Previous studies also show that modernization, religion and policies and politics explain 
differences between countries. The analyses presented here of differences in attitudes 
between countries in 2008 largely confirm these results and show the additional value of 
gender attitudes. When not controlling for any of the modernization, religious or politi-
cal factors, 29% of the difference in attitudes is explained by the country in which partici-
pants live. This drops to 3% when those factors are taken in account. 
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5 Specific cases
Academics have conducted dazzling analyses to pinpoint the causes of shifts in attitudes 
towards homosexuality over time and differences between countries (see chapter 4). 
Many factors appear relevant when one is looking for answers to the question of why 
some countries are more tolerant than others. However, a question that remains 
un answered is whether these factors can also shed light on why specific countries, which 
are quite similar in some aspects, have different public opinions on homosexuality. 
To see whether the factors identified in chapter 4 are indeed capable of illuminating the 
differences between specific countries which were reported in chapter 2, four pairs of 
countries are discussed in this chapter. Pairs were selected in consultation with stake-
holders whilst striving for a balance in terms of geography and attitudes. The countries 
selected for the pair-wise analyses should be close to each other in terms of geo-
graphy, but dissimilar in terms of attitudes. The four pairs that were selected were the 
Netherlands vs. Germany, Poland vs. Czech Republic, Portugal vs. Spain and Latvia vs. 
Lithuania.
The pairs of countries were compared using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyses. 
This analysis examines which part of a difference could be explained by the included fac-
tors. It also reveals the degree to which the included factors themselves contribute to the 
explanation. To give an example: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyses demonstrate 
that 35% of the difference in attitudes between country A and B could be explained by 
factor X and Y, and 65% of the difference remains unexplained. Of the 35% of the differ-
ence that was explained, 10% was explained by factor X and 25% by factor Y. Findings of 
the decomposition analyses for the four selected pairs will be discussed in this chapter. 
In addition, tentative explanations based on existing literature will be sought for factors 
such as country-level factors (which cannot be included in decomposition analyses) that 
offer explanations for the unexplained part of the differences.
specific c a ses
51 
Figure 5.1
Decomposition analyses of differences in attitude to justification of homosexuality between pairs of 
countriesa
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a  Explained and unexplained variances relate to the difference in country-level average attitudes 
towards the justification of homosexuality.
The question in the e vs is: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think 
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between...[homosexuality]’. Answers 
were given on a 10-point scale (1 = never, 10 = always).
Variables included in the analyses are age, education, income, unemployment, urbanization, reli-
gious denomination, importance religion, post-materialistic values and attitudes to gender.
Source: e vs’08
Figure 5.1 shows that the differences in attitudes between the Netherlands and Germany, 
and between the Czech Republic and Poland, are larger than the differences in at-
titudes between Spain and Portugal and between the two Baltic countries. Also, the 
included variables explain a large part of the difference in attitudes between Latvia 
and Lithuania, but a much smaller part of the difference between the Netherlands and 
Germany. Figure 5.2 shows which variables explain the differences in attitudes between 
the  countries.
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Figure 5.2
Decomposition analyses of differences in attitude to justification of homosexuality between pairs of 
countriesa
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a  Explained and unexplained variances are expressed as percentages of the mean difference. For 
example, income levels explain 9% of the difference in attitudes towards homosexuality between 
Germany and the Netherlands.
The question in the e vs is: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think 
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between...[homosexuality]’. Answers 
were given on a 10-point scale (1 = never, 10 = always).
Variables included in the analyses are age, education, income, unemployment, urbanization, 
 religious  denomination, importance religion, post materialistic values and attitudes to gender. 
Only those variables that make a significant contribution to explaining the difference are included 
in the figure.
Source: e vs’08
5.1 The Netherlands versus Germany
Both countries report relatively tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality compared 
to many other European countries, but the Dutch attitude towards homosexuality is 
significantly more tolerant than the German attitude (Meann l = 7.77, Meang e = 5.57). 
Dutch individuals consider homosexuality more justifiable than German individuals. 
The factors that were included in the analyses together explain 54% of the differences 
in attitude. The factors that explained the difference were level of education, religious 
denomination, urbanization, income and attitudes to gender roles. The fact that Dutch 
citizens are more accepting of homosexuality is explained by the findings that the Dutch 
participants have higher educational levels, more often do not belong to a religious 
denomination, more often live in urban areas, have higher levels of income and hold 
more liberal attitudes to gender roles than their German counterparts.22
While 54% of the difference in attitudes was explained by the included variables, 46% of 
the difference was not. Apparently, these factors tell far from the whole story. Based on 
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the literature review of macro-level factors that are related to differences in attitudes 
(and which cannot be included in Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyses), plus some 
qualitative reports of the situation and history of l gb citizens in the Netherlands and 
Germany, some tentative explanations can be offered:
– Germany was for a long time divided into two nations. The former German 
 Democratic Republic had a communist regime and became a member of the eu  after 
reunification in 1990. These factors are associated with more negative attitudes 
(chapter 4). One might think that this still resonates in different attitudes between 
Germans  living in the former East and West Germany. However, analyses show that in 
2008 there was no significant difference in attitudes between the two regions of the 
country (F = 1.46, p = .23).
– Sexual acts between consenting adults of the same sex were decriminalized in 
 Germany much later than in the Netherlands. These acts were decriminalized in the 
German Democratic Republic in 1968, and in 1969 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
but in the Netherlands this occurred as long ago as 1811 (after Holland was annexed by 
the French Empire and the Code Pénal came into force).
– Schuyf and Krouwel (1999) point to the role of the Dutch political culture, which is 
referred to as the ‘politics of accommodation’ (Lijphart 1968). Achieving consensus 
between various societal groups, all of which are minorities, has always been impor-
tant in the ‘pillarized’ Dutch society.
– From the 1950s onwards, the Church was losing ground in the Netherlands. Both the 
Dutch Reformed Church and the Dutch Catholic Church developed and expressed 
more progressive attitudes, including on sexuality. Reformed and Catholic clergy 
played an important role in calling for the acceptance of l gb individuals (Bos 2010).
– According to Moeller (2010) the German l gb movement did not benefit much 
from the sexual revolution, which was framed as a heterosexual revolution. In the 
 Netherlands, by contrast, the popular Dutch Society for Sexual Reform also advocated 
a change of attitudes towards homosexuality (Keuzenkamp and Bos 2007).
– In the 1960s and 70s, more and more popular public figures in the Netherlands came 
out as being gay. Homosexuality became more visible on television (for example in 
personality shows, soap operas and popular children’s programmes) and in theatres.
– Religious denomination also plays a role at country level. Non-religious individuals 
living in countries with a religious majority are more negative towards homosexual-
ity than non-religious individuals living in countries without a religious majority. 
Therefore, the higher number of Dutch inhabitants indicating that they do not belong 
to a religious denomination also influences Dutch attitudes towards homosexuality 
at country level. This is illustrated by the finding that German respondents not be-
longing to a religious denomination more often believe that homosexuality can never 
be justified (14.1%) than Dutch respondents who do not belong to a religious denomi-
nation (3.9%).
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5.2 Czech Republic versus Poland
Public attitudes towards homosexuality are more tolerant in the Czech Republic than in 
Poland (Meanc z = 4.84, Meanpl = 2.62). The factors included in the analysis were able to 
explain the vast majority of the difference (74%). Three factors form part of this expla-
nation: religious denomination, importance of religion and attitudes to gender roles. 
The relatively tolerant attitude of the Czech Republic can be explained by the fact that 
its citizens less often reported belonging to a Roman Catholic denomination; they also 
consider religion of lesser importance and report more liberal attitudes on gender roles.
A quarter of the difference in attitudes towards homosexuality between the Czech 
Republic and Poland could not be explained by the included variables. Possible addi-
tional explanations are:
– The predominant Protestantism in the former Czechoslovakia was strongly indi-
vidualistic and included respect for difference and dissent (Long 1999). Poland, on 
the other hand, had a much more family-oriented history. The Polish transition to 
democracy included a turn to ‘natural’ gender roles: a return to the traditional social 
roles of men and women was promoted by the former opponents of the communist 
regime and state policies today are very much pro-family (Keinz 2011). Homosexual 
individuals are portrayed as a threat to Polish family life, the pillar of the nation, and 
thus to Poland itself (Czarnecki 2007; Gruszczyska 2007).
– Civil society flourished in Czechoslovakia before the Second World War. The memory 
of that continued to influence Czech society over the years and has had a strong im-
pact on the l gb movement (Long 1999). The first l gb organization, a professional 
counselling network, was founded in Czechoslovakia in 1988 (Lambda Prague). After 
the Velvet Revolution, the l gb movement expanded rapidly. The gay movement had 
links with the Civic Forum and members of parliament. In 1990 Jiri Hromada, head of 
Lambda Prague, ran as an openly gay candidate for Parliament. He was not successful, 
but he was very visible in the media and his campaign served as a catalyst for gay and 
lesbian involvement in politics (Long 1999).
– In Poland, several gay and lesbian organizations were launched (though still illegally) 
following operation ‘Hyacinth’. From November 1985 to 1987, Polish communists 
had launched a campaign directed against homosexual individuals. Part of the cam-
paign included police raids on bars, public baths and other places where gay men 
used to meet. This triggered the growth of an organized l gb movement in Poland. 
However, it was only after the fall of communism in Poland that l gb organizations 
were legally recognized – the first being the Lambda Groups’ Association in 1990 
(Szulc 2011). At first they mainly focused on community-based activities: offering a 
safe place to meet, providing counselling and support groups, etc. In 2003 the public 
advertising campaign ‘Let Them See Us’ (Niech nas zobaczą) marked a breakthrough in 
the visibility of l gb individuals. The campaign aimed to provide positive images of 
l gb  individuals and to introduce the issue of sexual minority rights into the public 
discourse (Gruszczyska 2007). However, this growing visibility was met with strong 
resistance. Poland’s accession to the European Union (in 2004) and the rise of na-
tionalist, right-wing political forces fuelled homophobic sentiment further (see: 
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Gruszczyska 2007). In fact, l gb organizations were associated with the European inte-
gration process and paid a high price for it. “Their struggle was suddenly pictured as a 
symptom of the bad influence of the eu on Polish society, and their goals as involving 
threatening social models imported from the ‘West’” (Chetaille 2011: 127).
– At first glance, the feminist movement in Poland seems less strong than in the Czech 
Republic, and there has been less collaboration between Polish feminists and the 
lesbian movement (Kowalska 2011). To what extent other coalitions between l gb and 
other organisations were formed is not clear from the literature.
– The Czech Republic has a higher gpd per capita than Poland and a lower gini index. 
Higher levels of national income and lower levels of wealth inequality within a coun-
try are both related to more tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality.
– The vast majority of Polish people hold a Roman Catholic orientation and consider 
religion much more important than citizens of the Czech Republic. In highly religious 
countries, the Church has a wide influence on politics, culture and the social sphere 
in the country and thus negatively influences attitudes to homosexuality, even among 
individuals who are not themselves religious. This seems to be the case in these coun-
tries: while 23.5% of the Czech participants in the survey who do not belong to a reli-
gious denomination believe that homosexuality can never be justified, 38.5% of the 
non-religious Polish respondents hold that opinion.
5.3 Spain versus Portugal
Spanish citizens more often consider homosexuality justifiable than Portuguese 
 citizens (Meane s = 6.27, Meanp t = 4.38). A major part of this difference in attitudes can be 
explained by the included variables (69%). The factors that made the biggest contribu-
tion to explaining the difference were attitudes towards gender roles, urbanization and 
importance of religion. Spanish people are more accepting of homosexuality due to the 
fact that they live in more urban areas, consider religion less important and hold more 
liberal attitudes to gender roles. An additional, but minor, explanation is that the Span-
ish sample was more highly educated.
While a large part of the difference in attitude between Spain and Portugal was explained 
by the factors included in the analysis, around a third of the differences is attributable to 
other factors. Possible explanations may be found in the existing literature:
– Both Spain and Portugal have known a long period of dictatorship. The rule of the 
Spanish president ended in 1975, with the death of General Franco. In 1978 a new 
constitution was adopted under which all Spaniards acquired equal rights. Political 
parties and trade unions were legalized and social movements emerged. During the 
same period, l gb individuals began fighting for their rights (Llamas and Vila 1999). 
In Portugal, the period dictatorship ended with the Carnation Revolution in 1974. 
During the subsequent changes that took place in Portuguese society, there was no 
very active and politically significant l gb movement. It was only after the emergence 
of a ids and in the context of ng os set up to deal with the problem of a ids that the 
discussion of the specific needs of l gb individuals emerged in the 1980s (Carnero and 
Menezes 2007).
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– In Spain, there were many l gb organisations, which were also partly subsidized. After 
the withdrawal of public funding by the conservative Aznar government in the 1990s, 
l gb groups approached gay businesses to seek financial support. In exchange they 
promoted the gay scene. According to López Penedo (2012), this helped to articulate 
an open and very public l gb community. This increased visibility of l gb individuals 
coincided with a more positive presence of l gb characters on mainstream Spanish 
television (López Penedo 2012). This increased visibility might have contributed to the 
more tolerant attitude towards homosexuality in Spain.
– Spain has a higher gdp per capita than Portugal and a much lower gini coefficient, 
factors which are both related to greater tolerance of homosexuality.
– Spain has a higher gei score, which is also related to more tolerant attitudes towards 
homosexuality.
5.4 Latvia versus Lithuania
Both Latvia and Lithuania reported high levels of non-justifiability of homosexuality, but 
Lithuania reported higher levels of negative attitudes than Latvia (Meanlt = 2.42, Meanlv 
= 1.94). Some 83% of this difference could be explained, and only one factor played a 
role: attitudes towards gender roles. Most of the difference in attitudes between Latvia 
and Lithuania could be explained by the finding that people in Latvia hold more liberal 
 attitudes to gender roles than in Lithuania. To provide an example, 29% of people in Lat-
via disagree with the statement that ‘a job is ok, but what women really want is a home 
and children’. This figure is just 6% in Lithuania. Similarly, 47% of the population in 
Latvia consider ‘being a housewife just as fulfilling as having a job’, whereas in  Lithuania 
80% agree with that statement.
Around 15% of the difference in attitudes to homosexuality between Latvia and 
 Lithuania could not be explained by the factors included in the analysis. Some tentative 
suggestions for additional relevant factors can be made, but since we could not locate 
any literature on this issue, those factors are based on suggestions provided by stake-
holders23:
– Religion plays a more important role in Lithuania than in Latvia, with many Lithuani-
ans being Roman Catholic and strictly adhering to the rulings of the Vatican. The e vs 
2008 data confirm the dominance of Catholicism in Lithuania (79%) compared to Lat-
via (20%). In Latvia there is a mixture of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox  influences 
and therefore a lack of one predominant group that forces its line of thinking on 
 society.
– Another contributory factor could be that Mozaika, the Latvian l gb organisation, 
has been relatively successful in raising the issue, increasing visibility and lobbying. 
The organisation is anchored in civil society and has ties with other organisations or 
networks. For example, the main funder of Mozaika (the Soros foundation in Latvia), 
has a high standing. The Lithuanian sister organisation (l gl) is struggling more to 
attain those goals.
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5.5 Summary
Many factors that were reported in chapter 4 do indeed explain differences in attitudes 
between the Netherlands and Germany, between the Czech Republic and Poland, 
between Spain and Portugal and between Latvia and Lithuania. The majority of the 
differences could be attributed to differences in educational levels, income, religion, 
urbanization and attitudes towards gender roles. However, the portion of the difference 
that could be explained by the variables included in the analyses varied consider-
ably between the country pairs, with 54% of the difference in attitudes between the 
 Netherlands and Germany being explained, but 83% of the difference between Latvia 
and Lithuania. Also, not every difference in attitudes was explained by the same fac-
tors. For example, urbanization played an important role in explaining the relatively 
tolerant attitude of the Dutch (compared to the Germans) and the Spanish (compared to 
the Portuguese), but not in explaining differences between the Czechs and the Polish 
or between Latvians and Lithuanians. This shows that although the factors cited in the 
literature offer useful explanations, the explanatory power of specific factors depends 
on the social, historical and cultural legacy and structure of a given society – as is also 
illustrated by the role played by national historical events and the local l gb movement.
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6 Conclusion
The preceding chapters have explored shifts in attitudes towards homosexuality, differ-
ences in attitudes between European countries and possible explanations for divergent 
attitudes. This chapter presents a number of summarizing, criticizing, and concluding 
comments.
6.1 Shifts in public attitudes
This study has shown that attitudes towards homosexuality are subject to change. 
Europe is becoming more tolerant. However, different countries are moving at a very 
different pace and from very different starting positions. While some countries were 
already relatively tolerant in the early 1980s and continued to develop even more tolerant 
attitudes (e.g. Sweden), others report relatively negative attitudes towards homosexual-
ity and show no sign of increasing tolerance (e.g. Estonia). And there are also countries 
which reported relatively negative attitudes in the past but are a relatively tolerant 
 society today (e.g. Spain). No country has reported a consistent trend towards more 
negative attitudes to homosexuality.
Changes have not taken place at a consistent pace since the 1980s. It seems that, in 
general, the biggest leap towards tolerance was made in the last decade of the previous 
millennium (1990-1999), after which changes came to an end or became much smaller in 
the first decade of the new millennium. This development is seen in relatively tolerant 
countries (where the lack of progress is partly explained by the fact that the already rela-
tively high levels of tolerant leave less scope for progress), but also in relatively intoler-
ant countries.
The pace and consistency of changes in attitudes combined with the starting position 
of European countries in the early 1980s shape today’s picture of tolerance. Seen from 
this perspective, countries with tolerant attitudes are Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Spain. Following these 
relatively tolerant countries are Great Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Portugal and Italy. And European countries that could cur-
rently be characterized as relatively intolerant are Poland, Slovenia, Malta, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
6.2 Attitudes towards homosexuality and gender issues
The way in which countries deal with gender issues bears a moderate to strong relation-
ship with public opinion on homosexuality. Liberal attitudes towards gender roles at 
country level go hand in hand with tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality. In coun-
tries where citizens hold liberal attitudes to women in areas such as work and bringing 
up children, they also consider homosexuality to be more justifiable and less often cite 
homosexual individuals as unwanted neighbours. As well as gender attitudes, societal 
gender gaps also play a role. A country’s score on the Gender Equality Index (gei) – which 
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reflects gender gaps in education, literacy, income, employment and participation in 
highly qualified jobs such as senior executive functions or seats in parliament – is posi-
tively related to public opinion on homosexuality. Countries with smaller gender gaps in 
these societal domains report relatively tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality.
One gender dimension was found to be unrelated to country-level tolerance of homo-
sexuality, namely Hofstede’s cultural dimension masculinity/femininity. No substantial 
correlation was found between the degree to which a country could be described as 
‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ and public opinion on homosexuality. As also discussed in 
chapter 3, this is related to the fact that Hofstede’s masculine/feminine dimension has 
little to do with gender, but more with a traditional way of labelling societal characteris-
tics such as achievement or caring for others as typically masculine or typically feminine.
6.3 Differences between countries explained: modernization, religion and 
politics
The rise of more tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality in Europe since 1981, and the 
variance in tolerance between European countries today, is explained by social econom-
ics, modernization processes, religious factors and policies and politics. The literature, 
and the analyses presented here show that countries are more tolerant when:
– people hold values that are more in line with self-expression than survival concerns;
– income levels are high and income inequality is low;
– cities expand and few people live in small rural communities;
– people attain high levels of education;
– strict adherence to organized religion is low and less importance is attached to 
 religion;
– communism has been abolished;
– countries are (long-term) members of the eu;
– the (online) possibilities to link to global civil society are extensive;
– l gb movements exist, are strong and perhaps well connected to other organizations 
and movements.
The analyses in this study exploring differences in attitudes between countries in 2008 
show that 29% of the difference in attitudes is explained by the country in which citizens 
live. After controlling for the factors modernization, religion, policies and politics and 
gender issues, the country of residence explains only 3% of the variation in attitudes. 
This shows that the factors included in the analyses explain the majority of the differ-
ences in attitudes between countries. It also shows that, in addition to the factors found 
in the literature, some of the gender issues that were explored in chapter 3 provided 
additional explanations for differences in attitudes to homosexuality between countries 
in 2008. When attitudes to gender roles were added to a model explaining attitudes to 
homosexuality based on modernization, religion and policies and politics. gei did not 
provide an additional explanation.
Additional evidence of the usefulness of the factors in explaining levels of tolerance was 
found in the pair-wise country comparisons. Large parts of the differences in attitudes 
between the selected countries (the Netherlands versus Germany, Czech Republic versus 
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Poland, Spain versus Portugal and Latvia versus Lithuania) could be attributed to dif-
ferences in educational levels, income, religion, urbanization and attitudes towards 
gender roles. However, the parts of the variance in attitudes that could be explained in 
previous studies and in the current pair-wise analyses differed considerably and never 
accounted fully for the differences in attitudes. In addition, not every difference in atti-
tudes between countries was explained by the same factors. This shows that although 
the factors cited in the literature offer useful explanations, the explanatory power of 
specific factors depends on the social, historical and cultural legacy and structure of a 
given society.
6.4 Additional explanations
There is no single factor that determines attitudes towards homosexuality in a given 
country; attitudes are influenced by a myriad of factors. While many of these factors 
have been reviewed in this report, additional factors may also play a role which have not 
received attention in large-scale comparative studies and could therefore not be includ-
ed in chapter 4. Four of these potential factors will be highlighted here: critical events, 
moral leadership, visibility and migration.
The trend analyses and literature review described here provide general explanations, 
but cannot take into account crucial events that occur in a single country or in a par-
ticular year. Countries can experience a ‘critical moment’ which draws massive media 
and political attention and leads to a shift in public attitudes (Pollock 1994). It has been 
suggested that this has happened in the us, where the brutal killing of a young gay man 
named Matthew Sheppard caused a stir in the media and in political circles (Brewer 
2003). The same goes for the possible influence of ‘elite signals’, where important 
and influential key persons speak out on l gb issues and in so doing influence public 
 opinion.
Another factor that might influence public opinion on homosexuality is moral leader-
ship. Citizens base their opinions on how their moral leaders think about the issue. 
Examples of moral leaders are religious denominations or political parties. While the 
influence of religious denomination has been discussed and thoroughly examined in the 
literature, the role of political parties has received less attention. A study by Sherkat et 
al. (2011) illustrates the potential influence. The authors note that the resistance to equal 
rights for l gb individuals has become more vigorous in the Republican Party in the us 
during the last 20 years. Marriage equality has increasingly become a politically salient 
issue in the us, and the Republican Party has adopted an explicit profile as an opponent 
to such equality. Sherkat et al. (2011) show that in 1988, when marriage equality was a less 
prominent political issue, there were no differences in the support for marriage equality 
between Republicans, Democrats and Independents. In 2008, when marriage equality 
was a very topical en politically charged issue, Democrats and Independents were more 
supportive than the Republicans. It remains to be seen to what extent equal rights for 
l gb s will used by European politicians to give themselves a liberal or conservative pro-
file, and whether this will influence the attitudes of their supporters.
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The third important factor is the visibility of l gb people in the various countries. 
 Knowing someone who is l gb is associated with a more tolerant stance on l gb issues. 
Therefore, in countries where l gb s are more visible (either in the real world or in the 
media), attitudes towards homosexuality might be more tolerant. The pair-wise country 
comparisons also suggest that visibility plays an important role in explaining public 
opinion on homosexuality, with political visibility (in the case of the Czech Republic), 
the presence of l gb characters in mainstream t v shows and soaps (Spain) and rais-
ing awareness of the issue (Latvia) being offered as possible explanations for the rela-
tively tolerant attitudes compared to their comparison country (Poland, Portugal and 
 Lithuania, respectively).
The final factor that is often discussed as a possible explanation for attitudes to homo-
sexuality is migration. In countries with relatively high levels of acceptance, in particu-
lar, immigration from less tolerant regions is often perceived as a threat to the tolerance 
of homosexuality in the host country. While national studies show that migrants hold 
less permissive attitudes to homosexuality (for an example of a study on this issue in the 
Netherlands, see Huijnk and Dagevos 2012), it remains an open question whether differ-
ences in the influx of immigrant groups offers an additional explanation for differences 
in attitudes between European countries or over time.
6.5 Implications of the findings
Attitudes towards l gb individuals are not just a matter of private and individual opin-
ions. Public attitudes play an important role in l gb citizens’ everyday lives and partly 
determine how heterosexuals interact with l gb s. In addition, while the relationship 
between attitudes and policies or legislation depends to a large extent on the political 
structure of a country, varies between countries and changes over time, public opin-
ions, laws and policies are interconnected. Public opinion on l gb issues is therefore 
an important element in fostering equality and anti-discrimination laws and policies. 
Attitudes to homosexuality are becoming more tolerant, thus creating opportunities to 
increase the equality of l gb and heterosexual individuals. Of course, attitudes are not 
sufficient in themselves to bring about equal rights and end discrimination. However, 
tolerant public attitudes do engender a climate that may be more receptive to ideas 
of l gb equality and non-discrimination. In this way public opinion in, say, the Slovak 
Republic, with more than half the population taking a positive stance on homosexuality, 
creates an attitudinal climate where the introduction of laws on recognising same-sex 
partnerships and same-sex parenting rights might stand a chance.
In addition, some studies suggest that different attitudinal climates require different 
approaches to enhance equality and non-discrimination. The work of Lax and Phillips 
(2009) and Helfer and Voeten (2013) shows that different social climates call for differ-
ent advocacy approaches. For example, when the majority of the population supports 
the introduction of certain laws, it seems beneficial to try and make the issue at hand a 
salient political topic, since politicians follow public opinion on salient issues (Lax and 
Phillips 2009). By contrast, where the majority are not in favour of l gb equality and anti-
discrimination laws and policies, a different approach will be more useful. Helfer and 
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Voeten (2013) show that rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ecthr) on l gb 
issues are related to increases in the probability of national policies being pursued in the 
Council of Europe member states. This is especially the case in countries with govern-
ments that are not strongly opposed to l gb issues, but where public opinion is relatively 
negative. In that case, the ecthr rulings serve as a safe reference point for national 
courts and governments, and offer a more promising way of introducing l gb equality 
and anti-discrimination laws and policies. The introduction of new l gb policies and 
laws can in turn influence public opinion on these issues.
This study also has some implications for future research. First, this study was limited to 
the European context. Given the growing global attention for l gb issues, there is a need 
to examine the validity of certain claims (e.g. regarding shifts in attitudes and explana-
tions for differences) outside the European region as well. The World Values Survey offers 
an opportunity for this.
Secondly, within Europe, it is important to broaden the scope of the research on atti-
tudes by examining attitudes to specific groups within the l gb population (e.g. lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals; see also section 6.6) and assessing a wider 
range of topics (e.g. attitudes towards l gb rights in addition to justifiability and hav-
ing homosexual neighbours; see also section 6.6). The biennial European Social Survey 
(ess) offers the best opportunity for this. The ess is also the best gateway for exploring 
the idea that intolerant attitudes to homosexuality are a reflection of an underlying low 
tolerance of gender deviance (see also section 3.4). l gb individuals are often perceived 
as gender-nonconforming, and it might be a low tolerance of gender-incongruent behav-
iours which explains the negative attitude towards homosexuality. For example, a recent 
study by Keuzenkamp and Kuyper (2013) shows that the Dutch public are more negative 
in their attitudes towards ‘masculine’ women and ‘feminine’ men than towards gay men 
and lesbian women.
In addition, future studies should also try to examine the effects of the four additional 
potential explanations for differences in attitudes discussed in section 6.4. (critical 
events, moral leaders, visibility and immigration) and provide more insights into the 
interplay of attitudes, policies, politics, movements and change at local, national, and 
European level. Future studies should also address the shortcomings of the current 
study, as discussed in the next section.
6.6 Critical methodological comments
The e vs and ess offer the most reliable, large-scale data sets available to track changes 
in attitudes to homosexuality across a wide range of countries. However, using exist-
ing data sets and conducting secondary analyses have the inherent drawback that the 
 measurement of the issue at hand is not always as concise and elaborate as one would 
hope for. The measurement of attitudes to homosexuality has some unfortunate char-
acteristics in the e vs and ess. Drawbacks of the current measurements are the limited 
number of groups included, the restricted content of the items themselves and the odd 
location of the questions in the questionnaire.
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To begin with the first drawback, the e vs items reflecting attitudes towards homo-
sexuality use the terms ‘homosexuality’ and ‘homosexuals’. Many people associate these 
terms with gay men, hence this leads to a limited measurement of attitudes to homo-
sexuality in general (i.e. male and female homosexuality). The ess does not have this 
limitation, since the item measuring attitudes to homosexuality is worded as ‘gay men 
and lesbians’. Nowadays, however, academics, policymakers and national and interna-
tional politicians and institutions do not use the term ‘homosexuality’ when address-
ing these issues, but speak of l gbt individuals: lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
individuals. It is unfortunate that currently, no attention is paid to attitudes to bisexual 
and transgender individuals in the e vs or the ess. The most recent Eurobarometer sur-
vey (2012) and several national studies (e.g. Keuzenkamp and Kuyper 2013; Kuyper 2012; 
Van Lisdonk and Kooiman 2012) provide good examples of measuring attitudes towards 
other groups in the l gbt community.
While understandable from the point of view that the e vs and the ess have to cover 
many topics in just one questionnaire, from the perspective of comparing attitudes 
towards homosexuality it is unfortunate that those attitudes are only measured using 
one or two items that reflect a general attitude towards homosexuality. Other stud-
ies have shown that the attitude towards homosexuality is actually made up of several 
dimensions (e.g. Keuzenkamp and Kuyper 2013), and not all dimensions yield the same 
results. For example, while the general acceptance of homosexuality in the Netherlands 
is high, its social acceptance is limited in some cases. For example, while 13% of the 
Dutch population consider it offensive if a man and woman kiss each other in the street, 
this figure rises to 28% if the kissing couple are two women and to 41% if the kissing 
involves two men. Loftus (2001) also argues in favour of measuring several attitudinal 
dimensions by pointing out that people clearly distinguish between morality of homo-
sexuality (‘justification’) and the rights of l gb people. While someone may consider 
homosexuality to be morally wrong (not justifiable), that person can at the same time be 
willing to support civil liberties and equal rights for l gb people based on the fact that 
they are a minority group. Questions on morality of homosexuality often tap into atti-
tudes to sexual behaviour by l gb s, whereas questions about civil liberties relate to their 
minority group status.
The final drawback of the e vs data is the somewhat strange context in which attitudes 
towards homosexuality are surveyed. The item regarding the justifiability of homo-
sexuality is included in a long line of issues which participants are asked to indicate 
whether or not they consider them justified. In addition to homosexuality, this list 
includes a number of moral issues such as abortion, divorce, euthanasia and the death 
penalty, as well as antisocial behaviours such as unlawfully claiming state benefits, 
cheating on tax, joyriding, lying and fare dodging on public transport. This curious 
context in which the item on homosexuality is located is quite likely to influence the 
responses of the participants. The same holds true for the attitude towards unwanted 
neighbours; as well as homosexual individuals, other examples of unwanted neighbours 
given include people with a criminal record and drug addicts.
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6.7 Shifts in the future
It is impossible to say whether future attitudes towards homosexuality will become 
more tolerant, more intolerant or stay at their current level. Many factors would suggest 
an increase in tolerance in Europe. For example, educational levels are rising, the dura-
tion of democracy and eu membership is increasing, more attention has been devoted 
to l gb issues within the eu, and the global civil society and related movements are 
expanding. However, besides the fact that certain countries are not experiencing an 
increase in acceptance due to ‘ceiling effects’, at least two factors could halt progress 
towards more tolerance or even lead to diminishing levels of tolerance.
The first is the economic crisis that is currently holding Europe in its grip. With decreas-
ing levels of income and increasing levels of unemployment and material insecurity, 
intolerance can rise. When a country is confronted with political or economic uncer-
tainty, people turn their attention to basic needs and familiar traditional values, and 
hold more negative attitudes towards others who are dissimilar from them. Anderson 
and Fetner (2008) also warn against the possible backlash of certain economic events. 
For example, they argue that policies which have the primary aim of stimulating eco-
nomic growth, but which also result in greater inequality, lead to increased levels of 
social anxiety and social distrust, which are then expressed in negative attitudes to 
minority groups such as l gb people.
Another reason to believe that attitudes to homosexuality might not increase in every 
European country is that globalization in general, and a more unified Europe in particu-
lar, could also lead to stronger adherence to local or national values. In a world that is 
becoming increasingly homogenized, people tend to attach more importance to their 
own local or national values and traditions. If this holds true for attitudes to homosexu-
ality, it may be expected that in countries with a history of intolerance of homosexuality, 
no change will take place, or attitudes might even become more intolerant. Especially 
where tolerance of homosexuality is seen as something that is forced upon a country by 
the eu, strong anti-eu sentiments can spill over into intolerant attitudes towards l gb 
individuals among certain groups.
Whether the above push or the pull factors determining tolerance will have the greatest 
influence, and whether European countries will move towards more tolerant or more 
negative attitudes to homosexuality, will only become apparent when future data collec-
tions for the e vs and ess become available.
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Summary
Attitudes to homosexuality vary widely across Europe. While in one country thousands 
of l gb people and supportive heterosexuals take to the streets during gay pride events, 
in another country a similar number of people flock the streets to express their disap-
proval of homosexuality. Some European countries have opened the door to same-sex 
marriage, while in their neighbouring countries it is not possible to register relation-
ships between people of the same sex. And where the discussion of homosexuality has 
been established as one of the attainment targets in some countries, other countries are 
introducing legislation to prohibit ‘gay propaganda’ in schools.
In addition to wide differences in the legal context, there are also differences in public 
attitudes to homosexuality. A recent survey by the European Commission (2012), for 
example, shows that only 2% of the population in Sweden say they would feel uncom-
fortable with the idea of the governmental leader in the country being lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual (l gb). In the Slovak Republic, by contrast, only 2% would feel comfortable with 
this.
Attitudes to homosexuality are more than mere individual opinions, but form part of 
the social and political structures which foster or hinder the equality and emancipation 
of l gb citizens.1 Improving the social acceptance of homosexuality is accordingly one of 
the pillars of the Dutch government’s emancipation policy. The Dutch Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture and Science is responsible for coordinating this policy, and it was con-
sequently this Ministry which asked the Netherlands Institute for Social Research|scp 
to carry out a study of the international acceptance of homosexuality. In this report we 
provide answers to the following questions:
1 Which shifts in public attitudes towards homosexuality2 can be found in European 
countries?
2 To what degree are gender issues related to attitudes towards homosexuality in 
 Europe?
3 To what degree can differences in attitudes between European countries be explained 
by modernisation, religion and policies and politics?
The study draws on existing data from two large-scale studies which facilitate compari-
sons of European countries over time: the European Values Study (e vs) and the European 
Social Survey (ess). Both data sets contain questions on attitudes towards homosexual-
ity, produce comparable data across more than twenty countries and have been repeated 
on several occasions (e vs: 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008; ess: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 en 
2010). More information on the data sets may be found at www.scp.nl, www.european-
socialsurvey.org and www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
Changes in attitudes to homosexuality
The analyses show that the attitudes of the European population towards homosexual-
ity are not set in stone. Europe has become more tolerant over the last 30 years. In all 
countries – without exception – acceptance is greater today than at the start of the 1980s. 
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Acceptance of homosexuality rose particularly strongly in the period between 1990 
and 1999, following which the rate of increase in both relatively tolerant and relatively 
intolerant countries slackened off. There are however wide differences in the pace of the 
changes, their continuation and the starting positions of countries in the early 1980s. 
While some countries were already relatively tolerant in 1981 and also show a fairly 
consistent increase in acceptance (e.g. Sweden), there are also countries which were 
 relatively intolerant in 1981/1990 and which show little movement towards more accept-
ance (e.g. Estonia). In addition, there are countries which were relatively intolerant 
30 years ago but which are now characterised by a high level of acceptance (e.g. Spain). 
The fastest and biggest changes have taken place in Spain and the Slovak Republic, while 
change has been most limited in Romania, Slovenia and Hungary.
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
France and Spain were the most tolerant countries in 2008/2010. Less than a fifth of the 
population in these countries think that homosexuality can never be justified; less than 
a fifth cite homosexuals as people they would not want as neighbours; and more than 
three-quarters believe that gay men and lesbians should be allowed to live their lives 
as they wish. These countries are followed by a group of countries, made up of Great 
Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Portugal 
and Italy, where between a fifth and a third of the population believe that homosexual-
ity can never be justified, would prefer not to have homosexual neighbours and where a 
smaller majority think that gay men and lesbians should be allowed to live their lives as 
they wish. Between a third and half the population of Slovenia and Malta would not want 
to live next door to a gay person and believe that homosexuality can never be justified. 
Finally, there is a group of countries where a broad majority of the population feel that 
homosexuality can never be justified, would not want homosexuals as neighbours and 
disagree with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be allowed to live their 
lives as they wish. This group comprises Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
Relationship with gender issues
The report looks at whether there is a relationship between attitudes towards homo-
sexuality and a number of gender issues. First, the relationship between attitudes 
towards homosexuality and attitudes to the division of roles between men and women 
is investigated. These attitudes were found to be strongly associated: in countries where 
people hold more liberal views on gender roles, the acceptance of homosexuality is also 
greater. The study then examines whether the acceptance of homosexuality is related to 
the Gender Equality Index (gei). This index reflects levels of gender inequality in educa-
tion, economic participation and influence or power in a given country. Once again, 
a relationship is found: in countries where men and women are more equal in terms 
of education, economic participation and influence or power, the population takes a 
more positive stance on homosexuality. There are however exceptions to this. In the 
Baltic countries, for example, there is a relatively high degree of equality between men 
and women in the areas cited, but acceptance of homosexuality is limited. Finally, the 
relationship between the cultural dimension masculinity/femininity propounded by 
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Hofstede is examined. No relationship is found. This can perhaps be explained by the 
lack of ‘gender’ in Hofstede’s dimension. Although the dimensions are described as 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, these terms refer only to characteristics of a country such as 
competitiveness or caring for others. Apart from the name, therefore, the dimension in 
reality has little to do with masculinity or femininity.
Differences explained
A number of factors emerge from the literature and our analyses which are associated 
with greater acceptance of homosexuality. A relatively tolerant attitude to homo-
sexuality in a country is associated with:
– attaching more importance to post-materialistic values (e.g. attention for social is-
sues or well-being) than to values related to physical and economic safety;
– higher incomes and smaller income differentials within a country;
– a more urbanised population;
– higher education levels;
– a population with a less dominant religious denomination and where organised 
 religious gatherings are attended less frequently;
– more liberal views on the division of roles between men and women;
– the absence of a communist past;
– longer membership of the European Union (eu);
– stronger links to global civil society;
– a stronger l gb movement and, possibly, ties between that movement and other or-
ganisations or networks.
The above factors explain a very large part of the differences in acceptance of homo-
sexuality between countries. It should however be noted that a more in-depth 
investigation of comparisons between specific pairs of countries (e.g. if Dutch and 
German attitudes to homosexuality are examined, or if Czechs and Poles are compared), 
there is still a large part of the differences which cannot be explained by differences in 
the factors cited above. Although the factors offer a good explanation, therefore, their 
explanatory power does depend on a country’s social, historical and cultural context. 
Additional factors shown to be related to acceptance in the in-depth analyses included 
the local l gb movement, moral leadership by influential individuals and the visibility of 
homosexuality in society and the national media.
Qualifying comments
This report shows that Europe is on the way towards greater acceptance of homosexual-
ity, but that there are still wide differences between countries in terms of their starting 
position, the magnitude of the change and the continuance of the trend. The report 
also looks at the fact that changes in attitudes to homosexuality do not take place in a 
social or historical vacuum, but are associated with broader modernisation processes 
(e.g.  rising education levels), religious factors and political developments.
There are a number of limitations to this report. The data sets used are the most reliable 
currently available, but carry a number of drawbacks. For example, they contain only one 
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or two questions about homosexuality, making it impossible to determine accurately 
whether attitudes differ on different topics (e.g. attitudes towards same-sex marriage or 
parenting by same-sex couples). Moreover, the surveys contain no questions about the 
acceptance of specific groups. The questions are formulated in general terms and relate 
to homosexual men, and sometimes to lesbian women, but whether there are differ-
ences in the acceptance of these subgroups is not known. In addition, transgender and 
bisexual individuals are not mentioned at all in these surveys.
Recommendations
Public attitudes can influence political decision-making on the rights of l gb individuals. 
Different social climates demand a different approach in seeking to foster equal rights. 
Other recommendations relate to future research, which should take more account of 
the diversity within the target group (e.g. differences in attitudes towards lesbian  women 
and gay men, attitudes to transgender and bisexual individuals) and which should 
investigate what role rejection of gender-nonconformity plays in negative attitudes to 
homosexuality.
Tolerance in the future
Whether Europe will become more tolerant in the future remains to be seen. On the one 
hand there are reasons to assume that the acceptance of homosexuality will increase 
further: average education levels are rising, fewer and fewer people live in small rural 
communities, the length of eu membership is increasing and the opportunities for link-
ing (including online) to global civil society and l gb movements are increasing rapidly. 
There are also several European countries, institutions and regulations which argue for 
more equality for l gb citizens in Europe. These factors could contribute to a further 
increase in the acceptance of homosexuality.
At the same time, however, there are at least two important reasons for not assum-
ing that it is certain that social acceptance of homosexuality will increase everywhere. 
First, the economic crisis is holding Europe firmly in its grip. Unemployment is rising, 
incomes are falling and – depending on the policy pursued – income differentials are 
widening. These are factors that are associated with less social acceptance. When a coun-
try is going through difficult political or economic times, people are inclined to turn 
to traditional values which offer certainty and to focus on their physical and economic 
needs. This often takes place at the expense of a tolerant attitude to minorities, includ-
ing lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals.
The second reason for questioning whether the acceptance of homosexuality will con-
tinue to increase is the phenomenon that in an increasingly globalising world, people 
often wish to protect local and national customs. People seek to hold onto traditions 
and values that they regard as an intrinsic part of their own country, while issues that 
are perceived as being ‘imposed by Europe’ are rejected. If this process also occurs with 
regard to the acceptance of homosexuality, it may be that countries with negative atti-
tudes in past and present will continue to hold on to this intolerance. Anti-eu sentiment 
could even turn attitudes more negative within certain groups.
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Dutch Summary (Nederlandse Samenvatting)
In Europa bestaan grote verschillen in de omgang met homoseksualiteit. Waar in het ene 
land duizenden homoseksuelen en solidaire heteroseksuelen op de been zijn tijdens gay 
prides, is in het andere land eenzelfde hoeveelheid mensen op de been om hun afkeur 
van homoseksualiteit te uiten. Sommige Europese landen hebben het burgerlijk huwe-
lijk opengesteld voor paren van gelijk geslacht, terwijl in hun buurlanden registratie 
van relaties tussen personen van gelijk geslacht niet mogelijk is. En waar in Nederland 
het bespreken van homoseksualiteit sinds eind 2012 in de kerndoelen van het onderwijs 
staat, voeren andere landen juist wetgeving in om ‘homo- propaganda’ op scholen te 
verbieden.
Naast grote verschillen in de wettelijke context zijn er verschillen in de houding van 
de bevolking ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit. Zo laat een recent onderzoek van de 
Europese Commissie (2012) zien dat in Zweden slechts 2% van de bevolking aangeeft zich 
oncomfortabel te voelen bij het idee dat de hoogste leider in het land lesbisch, homo-
seksueel of biseksueel (l hb) zou zijn. In Slowakije zou slechts 2% zich hier comfortabel 
bij voelen.
Attituden ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit zijn meer dan slechts individuele op-
vattingen, zij vormen een onderdeel van maatschappelijke en politieke structuren die 
gelijkheid en emancipatie van l hb burgers bevorderen of belemmeren. Het bevorderen 
van de sociale acceptatie van homoseksualiteit vormt dan ook een van de peilers van het 
emancipatiebeleid van de Nederlandse regering. Het ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur 
en Wetenschap (oc w)coördineert dit beleid. Vanuit dit ministerie kwam dan ook de 
vraag aan het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (scp) om onderzoek te doen naar de in-
ternationale acceptatie van homoseksualiteit. In dit rapport geven wij antwoord op de 
volgende vragen:
1 Welke veranderingen in de houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit vinden er 
plaats in Europa?
2 In hoeverre hangt de houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit samen met de om-
gang met gender issues in Europese landen?
3 In hoeverre vallen verschillen in homoacceptatie tussen landen toe te schrijven aan 
andere verschillen tussen landen zoals verschillen in modernisering, religie en poli-
tiek?
Het onderzoek maakt gebruik van bestaande data uit grootschalige studies die vergelij-
kingen tussen Europese landen door de tijd heen mogelijk maken: de European Values 
Study (e vs) en de European Social Survey (ess). Beide datasets bevatten vragen over 
de houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit, vergelijkbare gegevens voor meer dan 
twintig landen en zijn herhaaldelijk uitgevoerd (e vs: 1981, 1990, 1999 en 2008; ess: 2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008 en 2010). Meer informatie over de datasets is te vinden op www.scp.nl, 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org en www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
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Veranderingen in houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit
De analyses laten zien dat de houding van de Europese bevolking ten opzichte van 
homoseksualiteit niet in steen gebeiteld is. Gedurende de afgelopen 30 jaar is Europa 
toleranter geworden. In alle landen – zonder uitzondering – is de acceptatie op dit 
moment groter dan begin jaren tachtig. Met name in de periode tussen 1990 en 1999 
nam in veel landen de acceptatie van homoseksualiteit toe. Daarna zwakte de toename 
in zowel relatief tolerante als relatief intolerante landen af. Er zijn echter grote onder-
linge verschillen in het tempo van de veranderingen, het doorzetten van veranderingen 
en de uitgangsposities van landen begin jaren tachtig. Terwijl er landen zijn die in 1981 
al relatief tolerant waren en daar bovenop een vrij consistente toename van acceptatie 
laten zien (bijv. Zweden), zijn er ook landen die in 1981/1990 relatief intolerant waren en 
die weinig beweging naar meer acceptatie laten zien (bijv. Estland) en landen die 30 jaar 
geleden relatief intolerant waren, maar nu een hoog niveau van acceptatie kennen (bijv. 
Spanje). De snelste en grootste veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden in Spanje en Slo-
wakije, terwijl verandering het meest beperkt was in Roemenië, Slovenië en Hongarije.
IJsland, Noorwegen, Zweden, Finland, Denemarken, Nederland, België, Duitsland, 
Frankrijk en Spanje zijn in 2008/2010 het meest tolerant. In deze landen vindt minder 
dan een vijfde van de bevolking homoseksualiteit nooit gerechtvaardigd, beschouwt 
minder dan een vijfde homoseksuelen als ongewenste buren en vindt meer dan drie-
kwart dat homoseksuele mannen en lesbische vrouwen vrij moeten zijn om hun leven te 
leiden zoals zij dat zelf willen. Daarna volgt de groep landen waar een vijfde tot een der-
de homoseksualiteit nooit gerechtvaardigd vindt, liever geen homoseksuele buren heeft 
en een krappere meerderheid vindt dat homoseksuele mannen en lesbische vrouwen 
vrij moeten zijn om hun eigen leven te leiden: Groot Brittannië, Ierland, Noord Ierland, 
Oostenrijk, Tsjechië, Slowakije, Portugal en Italië. Vervolgens wil een derde tot de helft 
van de Sloveense en Maltese bevolking niet naast een homo wonen en vinden zij homo-
seksualiteit niet gerechtvaardigd. Als laatste is er een groep landen waarin, grofweg, 
de meerderheid van de bevolking vindt dat homoseksualiteit nooit te rechtvaardigen 
valt, homoseksuelen ongewenst zijn als buren en ook de meerderheid het niet eens is 
met de stelling dat deze groep vrij moet zijn om te leven zoals zij zelf willen. Deze groep 
bestaat uit Polen, Bulgarije, Roemenië, Hongarije, Estland, Letland, Litouwen, Rusland 
en Oekraïne.
Samenhang met gender issues
In het rapport is gekeken of de houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit samenhangt 
met verschillende gender issues. Allereerst werd de samenhang tussen de houding ten 
opzichte van homoseksualiteit en de houding ten opzichte van de taakverdeling tus-
sen mannen en vrouwen onderzocht. Deze bleken sterk met elkaar samen te hangen. 
In landen waar men vrijere opvattingen heeft over de taakverdeling is de acceptatie 
van homoseksualiteit ook groter. Vervolgens werd onderzocht of de acceptatie van 
homoseksualiteit gerelateerd was aan de Gender Equality Index (gei). Deze maat geeft 
de sekseongelijkheid in opleiding, economische participatie en invloed of macht in 
een land weer. Ook hier werd een verband gevonden: landen waarin beide seksen meer 
gelijk zijn met betrekking tot opleiding, economische participatie en invloed of macht, 
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staat de bevolking positiever ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit. Hierop zijn echter wel 
uitzonderingen. Zo is er in de Baltische landen een relatief grote gelijkheid tussen man-
nen en vrouwen op de genoemde gebieden, maar is de acceptatie van homoseksualiteit 
beperkt. Tot slot werd de samenhang tussen de cultuurdimensie mannelijkheid/vrouwe-
lijkheid van Hofstede onderzocht. Hier werd geen relatie mee gevonden. Dit kan wellicht 
worden verklaard door het gebrek aan ‘gender’ in Hofstede’s dimensie. De dimensie 
heten ‘mannelijk’ en ‘vrouwelijk’, maar daar worden slechts eigenschappen als compe-
tentiegerichtheid of zorgzaamheid mee bedoeld. Naast de naam lijkt de dimensie dus 
eigenlijk weinig met mannelijkheid of vrouwelijkheid van doen te hebben.
Verschillen verklaard
Uit de literatuur en onze analyses komen een aantal factoren voor die samengaan met 
meer acceptatie van homoseksualiteit. Een relatief tolerante houding ten opzichte van 
homoseksualiteit in een land hangt samen met:
– het hechten van een groter belang aan postmaterialistische waarden (bijv. aandacht 
voor sociale kwesties of welzijn) dan aan waarden die te maken hebben met fysieke en 
economische veiligheid;
– hogere inkomens en kleinere inkomensverschillen binnen een land;
– een meer stedelijk wonende bevolking;
– een hoger opleidingsniveau;
– een bevolking die zich minder tot een bepaalde religieuze stroming rekent en minder 
frequent georganiseerde religieuze bijeenkomsten bezoekt;
– vrijere opvattingen over de taakverdeling tussen mannen en vrouwen;
– de afwezigheid van een communistisch verleden;
– een langduriger lidmaatschap van de Europese Unie (eu);
– sterkere banden met de ‘global civil society’;
– een sterkere homobeweging en de verbondenheid hiervan met andere organisaties of 
netwerken.
De bovengenoemde factoren verklaren een zeer groot deel van de verschillen in accep-
tatie van homoseksualiteit tussen landen. Wel moet worden opgemerkt dat als er dieper 
wordt ingegaan op paarsgewijze vergelijkingen tussen specifieke landen (bijv. als de 
Nederland houding en de Duitse houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit onder de 
loep worden genomen, of de Tsjechische en de Poolse met elkaar worden vergeleken), 
dat er dan ook nog een groot deel van de verschillen niet door verschillen in boven-
genoemde factoren kan worden verklaard. Alhoewel de factoren dus een goede ver-
klaring bieden, lijkt hun verklarende kracht wel afhankelijk van de sociale, historische 
en culturele context van een land. Factoren die binnen landen nog gerelateerd zijn 
aan de acceptatie, zijn bijvoorbeeld de lokale en nationale homo-beweging, moreel 
 leiderschap van invloedrijke personen en de zichtbaarheid van homoseksualiteit in een 
samenleving en de nationale media.
Kanttekeningen
Het huidige rapport laat zien dat Europa op weg is naar een grotere sociale acceptatie van 
homoseksualiteit, maar dat er grote verschillen zijn tussen landen naar startpositie, de 
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grootte van de verandering en het doorzetten van de trend. Ook is ingegaan op het feit 
dat veranderingen in de houding ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit niet in een sociaal of 
historisch vacuüm plaatsvinden, maar samengaan met bredere moderniseringsproces-
sen (bijv. stijgende opleidingsniveaus), religieuze factoren en politieke ontwikkelingen.
Het rapport kent een aantal beperkingen. De gebruikte datasets zijn de meest betrouw-
bare die op dit moment voorhanden zijn, maar er kleven toch een aantal nadelen aan. 
Zo worden er slechts één of twee vragen over homoseksualiteit gesteld, waardoor niet 
goed in kaart gebracht kan worden of de houdingen verschillen voor verschillende 
onderwerpen (bijv. de houding ten opzichte van het openstellen van het huwelijk of 
adoptie door paren van gelijk geslacht). Ook bevatten de onderzoeken geen vragen over 
de acceptatie van specifieke groepen. De vragen zijn algemeen gesteld en hebben betrek-
king op homoseksuele mannen en, soms, op lesbische vrouwen maar of er verschillen 
zijn in de acceptatie van die groepen is niet bekend. Transgenders en biseksuelen komen 
bovendien in deze enquêtes helemaal niet aan bod.
Aanbevelingen
De houding van de bevolking kan van invloed zijn op politieke besluiten over de rechten 
van l hbs. Verschillende sociale klimaten vragen om een verschillende aanpak vragen bij 
het bevorderen van gelijke rechten voor deze groep. Andere aanbevelingen gelden voor 
toekomstig onderzoek. Dit zou meer rekening moeten houden met de diversiteit binnen 
de doelgroep (bijv. verschillen in houding ten opzichte van lesbische vrouwen en homo-
seksuele mannen, houdingen ten aanzien van transgenders) en moeten onderzoeken 
welke rol de afkeer van gender non-conformiteit speelt bij een negatieve attitude ten 
opzichte van homoseksualiteit.
Tolerantie in de toekomst
Of Europa zich naar meer tolerantie gaat bewegen in de toekomst, is nog maar de vraag. 
Aan de ene kant zijn er redenen om aan te nemen dat de acceptatie van homo seksualiteit 
verder zal toenemen. Immers, het gemiddelde opleidingsniveau stijgt, steeds minder 
mensen wonen in kleine plattelandsgemeenten, de duur van eu lidmaatschappen neemt 
toe en de mogelijkheden om (online) aan te sluiten bij de wereldwijde ‘civil society’ 
en homobeweging nemen in rap tempo toe. Ook zijn er verscheidene Europese lan-
den, instituties en regels die voor meer gelijkwaardigheid voor l hb burgers in Europa 
opkomen. Deze factoren kunnen bijdragen aan een verder toenemende acceptatie van 
homoseksualiteit.
Er zijn echter tegelijkertijd minstens twee belangrijke redenen om aan te nemen dat niet 
zeker is dat de sociale acceptatie overal toe zal nemen. Ten eerste houdt de economische 
crisis flink huis in Europa. De werkeloosheidcijfers stijgen, inkomens dalen en – afhan-
kelijk van het gevoerde beleid – inkomensverschillen worden groter. Dit zijn factoren 
die samengaan met minder sociale acceptatie. Als een land in politieke of economische 
zwaardere tijden verkeerd, zijn mensen geneigd om zich te richten op traditionele waar-
den die zekerheid bieden en zich te bekommeren om fysieke en economische behoef-
ten. Dit gaat vaak ten koste van een tolerante houding ten opzichte van minderheden, 
 waaronder homoseksuele mannen, lesbische vrouwen, biseksuelen en  trans genders.
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De tweede reden om vraagtekens te plaatsen bij een toenemende acceptatie van homo-
seksualiteit is het verschijnsel dat bij een toenemende globalisering, mensen vaak lokale 
en nationale gebruiken willen beschermen. Tradities en waarden die men bij het eigen 
land vindt horen wil men behouden, terwijl zaken die worden ervaren als ‘iets dat moet 
van Europa’ worden verworpen. Als dit proces zich ook voor doet op gebied van accepta-
tie van homoseksualiteit, dan kan het zijn dat landen met een negatieve houding in ver-
leden en heden blijven vasthouden aan deze intolerantie. Door anti-eu sentimenten kan 
daar de houding binnen bepaalde groepen wellicht zelfs negatiever worden.
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Appendix A  Country abbreviations
Country code Country  Country code Country
al Albania ie Ireland
am Armenia is Iceland
at Austria it Italy
az Azerbaijan lt Latvia
ba Bosnia-Herzegovina lu Luxembourg
be Belgium lv Lithuania
bg Bulgaria md Moldova
by Belarus me Montenegro
ch Switzerland mk Macedonia
cy Cyprus mt Malta
cy-tcc Northern Cyprus nl Netherlands
cz Czech Republic no Norway
de Germany pl Poland
dk Denmark pt Portugal
ee Estonia ro Romania
es Spain rs Serbia
fi Finland rs-km Kosovo
fr France ru Russian Federation
gb-gbn Great Britain se Sweden
gb-nir Northern Ireland si Slovenia
ge Georgia sk Slovak Republic
gr Greece tr Turkey
hr Croatia ua Ukraine
hu Hungary
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Appendix B  Additional tables chapter 2
Table B.1
Indications of significance of changes in attitude towards justification of homosexuality. A + indicates 
a significant increase in tolerant attitudes between the two years; a – indicates a significant decrease 
in tolerant attitudes between the two years; and a ∞ indicates no change in attitudes between the two 
years. A blank space indicates that in that year, the country did not take part in the data collection. 
Norway did not collect data in 1999, so the change between 1990 and 2008 was examined
 1981 to 1990 1990 to 1999 1999 to 2008
Northern Europe + + +
Iceland + + +
Norway + +
Sweden ∞ + ∞
Finland + +
Denmark - + +
Western Europe + + +
The Netherlands + + ∞
Belgium + + +
Germany + + ∞
France + + +
Great Britain ∞ + +
Ireland + + +
Northern Ireland + + ∞
Austria + ∞
Central/Eastern Europe + ∞
Poland + ∞
Bulgaria + ∞
Romania + +
Czech Republic + -
Slovak Republic + ∞
Slovenia + -
Hungary - +
Estonia + -
Latvia ∞ +
Lithuania + ∞
Southern Europe + + +
Italy + +
Spain + + +
Portugal + +
Malta   +  + 
Source: e vs’81; e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’08
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Table B.2
Indications of significance of changes in attitude on whether the respondent would not want to have 
homosexual neighbours. A + indicates a significant increase in tolerant attitudes between the two 
years; a – indicates a significant decrease in tolerant attitudes between the two years; and a ∞ in-
dicates no change in attitudes between the two years. A blank space indicates that in that year, the 
 country did not take part in the data collection. 
 1990 to 1999 1999 to 2008
Northern Europe + +
Iceland + +
Sweden + ∞
Finland ∞ +
Denmark + ∞
Western Europe + +
The Netherlands + -
Belgium + +
Germany + -
France + +
Great Britain + +
Ireland + +
Northern Ireland + ∞
Austria + ∞
Central/Eastern Europe + +
Poland + ∞
Bulgaria + ∞
Romania + +
Czech Republic + ∞
Slovak Republic + +
Slovenia ∞ +
Estonia + ∞
Latvia + ∞
Lithuania + ∞
Southern Europe + +
Italy + ∞
Spain + +
Portugal + ∞
Malta  ∞  + 
Source: e vs’90; e vs’99; e vs’08
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Table B.3
Indications of significance of changes in attitude on whether gay men and lesbians should be free 
to live their lives as they wish. A + indicates a significant increase in tolerant attitudes between the 
two years; a – indicates a significant decrease in tolerant attitudes between the two years; and a ∞ 
indicates no change in attitudes between the two years. A blank space indicates that in that year, the 
 country did not take part in the data collection. The Czech Republic and Greece did not collect data in 
2006, so the changes between 2004 and 2008 were examined.
 2002 to 2004 2004 to 2006 2006 to 2008 2008 to 2010
Northern Europe + ∞ + +
Norway + ∞ ∞ +
Sweden + + ∞ +
Finland + ∞ + ∞
Denmark ∞ ∞ + ∞
Western Europe ∞ ∞ + +
Netherlands ∞ ∞ + +
Belgium ∞ ∞ + ∞
Germany ∞ ∞ + ∞
France ∞ ∞ + -
Great Britain + ∞ ∞ +
Ireland - ∞ +
Austria ∞ ∞
Switzerland - ∞ + ∞
Central/Eastern Europe - - + +
Poland ∞ + ∞ ∞
Russian Federation ∞ ∞
Ukraine - ∞
Bulgaria - +
Czech Republic ∞ + ∞
Slovak Republic ∞ ∞
Slovenia ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Hungary ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Estonia - + ∞
Southern Europe ∞ + ∞ +
Greece ∞ ∞
Spain - + + ∞
Portugal - ∞ ∞ -
Source: ess’02, ’04, ’06, ’08, ’10
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Appendix C Multi-level analysis
Table C.1
factor model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
female 0.850*** 0.822*** 0.946*** 0.901*** 0.874*** 0.524*** 
self-expression values  
(ref. materialist)
mixed 0.618*** 0.533*** 0.486*** 0.438*** 0.429*** 0.294*** 
post-materialist 1.587*** 1.339*** 1.239*** 1.202*** 1.152*** 0.767*** 
unemployed 0.523*** 0.527*** 0.470*** 0.182** 0.176** 0.199*** 
income 0.244*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.047*** 
gdp per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000   
gini -0.087* -0.088* -0.105* -0.108* -0.141*** -0.123*** 
urbanization 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.082*** 
education (ref. low)
middle 0.877*** 0.735*** 0.462*** 0.469*** 0.236*** 
high 1.414*** 1.289*** 1.049*** 1.054*** 0.566*** 
religious denomination  
(ref. no denomination)
free -1.059*** -1.122*** -1.036*** -0.946*** 
muslim -1.746*** -2.215*** -2.289*** -1.698*** 
orthodox -0.433*** -0.425*** -0.453*** -0.209   
various -1.024*** -1.010*** -1.022*** -0.764*** 
protestant -0.163* -0.091 -0.045 -0.009   
roman catholic -0.361*** -0.292*** -0.246*** -0.064   
importance religion 0.452*** 0.359*** 0.337*** 0.179*** 
religion country  
(ref. no majority)
> 70% roman catholic -0.421 -0.578 -0.510 -0.181   
> 70% protestant -0.524 -0.510 -0.165 -0.783*  
> 70% orthodox 0.367 0.133 0.356 0.410   
> 70% no religion -1.364* -1.379* -0.748 -0.150   
age (ref. 15-24)
25-34 -0.094 -0.089 -0.073   
35-44 -0.441*** -0.445*** -0.444*** 
45-54 -0.646*** -0.657*** -0.585*** 
54-65 -0.975*** -0.989*** -0.833*** 
> 65 -1.575*** -1.572*** -1.199*** 
appendix c
79 
Table C.1 (continued)
factor model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
political orientation -0.114*** -0.079*** 
communist past -1.295** -1.314*** 
length of eu membership 0.011 0.008   
attitude towards gender -9.702*** 
Gender Equality Index 0.034   
% unexplained variance 
at country level 28.8 7.2 7.7 7.0 7.9 5.3 2.8
a  Higher scores indicate higher income.
b  Higher gdp indicates more country-level income.
c  Higher gini indicates more income inequality within a country.
d  Higher scores indicate more urbanized residential areas.
e  Higher scores indicate more importance attached to religion.
f  Higher scores indicate more political affiliation with right wing.
g  Higher scores indicate more conservative gender attitudes.
h  Higher gei indicates more gender equality in education, economic participation and power.
The dependent variable is the attitude towards justification of homosexuality; higher scores indicate more 
justification.
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Notes
1 Although we are aware that the l gb t community (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender  individuals) 
also includes people with different gender identities and gender expressions, we will be talking 
about l gb individuals in this report since no long-term European data are available for transgender 
individuals. Talking about l gb t individuals would merely mask this shortcoming.
2 We refer in this report to attitudes towards homosexuality, since this is the way most items in the e vs 
and e ss were framed and no questions on bisexuality are included in the e vs or e ss. 
3 The findings will be presented on the basis of currently existing countries. This means that figures 
for the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic will be presented separately, even though during the first 
rounds of e vs data collection these countries still formed one country (Czechoslovakia). One figure 
will be presented for Germany, even though Germany was two countries during the first round of e vs 
data collection. 
4 Data were also collected in Azerbaijan and Kosovo, but e ss guidelines were not followed in these 
countries and they are therefore excluded from the analyses discussed here.
5 Of course, it is debatable in which region some countries should be placed (e.g. Estonia could be 
North or Central/East, Slovenia could be in the South or Central/East, Austria could be in West or 
Central/East, etc.).
6 In 2008, Italy used a different formulation for the question on justification of homosexuality. Italian 
figures are therefore missing for 2008. Norway did not take part in the 1999 wave of the e vs.
7 When interpreting the percentages, it should be borne in mind that there are differences between 
countries in the occurrence of missing values. For example, on average around 5% of respondents 
in the 2008 e vs round did not answer the question or answered ‘don’t know’. In some countries 
this percentage is much higher (e.g. above 10% in Sweden, the Slovak Republic, Portugal, Malta and 
Bulgaria) while in others it is much lower (e.g. around 2% in Norway, France, Belgium and Denmark). 
This might influence the reported percentages. In the present study, missing answers and respond-
ents indicating that they do not know are coded as missing values.
8 Hungary used a different formulation for the question on homosexual neighbours and Hungarian 
figures are therefore missing. Norway did not take part in the 1999 wave of the e vs. Since this leaves 
data for only two e vs waves for Hungary and Norway, these countries were excluded from these 
analyses altogether.
9 When interpreting the percentages, it should be borne in mind that there are differences between 
countries in the occurrence of missing values. This might influence the reported percentages. See 
also note 7.
10 When interpreting the percentages, it should be borne in mind that there are differences between 
countries in the occurrence of missing values. This might influence the reported percentages. 
A study of the missing value data in e ss 2002, 2004, and 2006 indicated that differences in missing 
values are mainly caused by participants answering ‘don’t know’ and that the percentage of missing 
values is related to the method of survey completion (computer-assisted or pencil and paper) (Koch 
and Blohm 2009)
11  It remains to be seen whether this holds true for Austria, which reported 72% tolerance in 2006 and 
did not subsequently participate in the e ss.
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12 Not all countries completed all three questions. For example, Malta and Iceland were not included in 
the e ss, while Russia and Ukraine were not included in the e vs.
13 Correlations of .50 (or -.50) or higher are seen as indicative of a strong relationship; correlations 
 between .30 and .50 (or -30 and -.50) are perceived as a medium relationship; and correlations be-
tween .10 and .30 (-.30 and -.10) are regarded as a weak or very weak relationship.
14 The factors were constructed by means of a confirmatory factor analyses.
15 The selection was based on the relevance of the content and availability for 2008.
16 gei scores were not available for all countries in 2008.
17 Hofstede scores were not available for all countries.
18 For the analyses, the Hofstede scores presented on the website www.geert-hofstede.com were used. 
Taras et al. (2012) calculated new standardized scores based on meta-analyses. When using their 
scores, correlations are somewhat higher but remain in the low range, and the same diverse pat-
tern was found (i.e. feminine countries with tolerant attitudes, masculine countries with intolerant 
attitudes, but also vice versa). The number of countries that could be included in these analyses was 
more limited, and we have therefore opted to use the scores from the website.
19 When interpreting the strength and magnitude of the relationships, it is important to take into 
account that relationships between country-level issues such as public attitudes are relatively high 
because they ignore variation within countries.
20 The reason for this is that there are no data available from 1981 till 2008 for all included measures 
(e.g. Social Watch started with the Gender Equality Index in 2007; not all gender attitudes were 
 included in the earlier waves of e vs).
21 It is important to note that these results should not be interpreted as providing proof that some 
findings of previous studies (e.g. concerning gdp or religion) are not correct. The deviating results 
are likely to be related to differences in measurements and differences in the included countries and 
factors. Inclusion or exclusion of certain factors exerts an influence on the relevance of other factors. 
Since previous studies have included different factors, different measures and different countries, 
it is not surprising that they yield different results. If anything, the analysis here shows the impor-
tance of a well-designed model for including or excluding certain factors and countries.
22 Indicators of education, urbanization, religion, etc. are taken from the e vs data set and might not be 
comparable with official macrolevel indicators from the oe cd or Eurostat, for example.
23 Linda Freimane and Juris Lavrikovs (il g a-Europe).
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